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ABSTRACI' 
Algeria's current political crisis serves as a reminder of the fragility of 
attempts to reform governments in search of "democracy." Algeria experienced 
two rounds of multi-party elections in 1990 and 1991. Broad-based political 
participation may indicate "fast-track" democracy, but questions about the 
feasibility of political Islam clashes with traditional notions of democracy. 
This thesis will argue that Algeria's decision for a political opening was 
due to social pressures and exacerbated by economic difficulties posed by falling 
oil prices rather than motivated solely by political reform rationale. The events 
leading up to the riots and subsequent reforms will support this argument. 
Additionally, U.S. and regional policy implications will be examined. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Algeria won its independence from France in 1962 after a protracted war. 
From 1962 until 1989 Algeria was run as a single party state. Major rioting took 
place in 1988, culminating in constitutional reforms and promises of broad-based, 
multi-party elections. What happened to the National Liberation Front's (FLN) 
ability to maintain power? What prompted the regime to move toward multi-
party politics instead of merely suppressing the rioters? Why were the Islamists 
so popular at the polls? Did the regime have good cause to cancel the election 
results, or were the FLN and the military just unwilling to transfer power? 
The FLN were not unopposed in the past, but there was no authorized, 
organized opposition. This thesis demonstrates that economic necessity coupled 
with social unrest precipitated the reforms. Election irregularities and concern 
over Islamists who may support "one person, one vote, one time" threatened the 
existing government, (and perhaps all who had visions of a secular Algeria) 
prompting the cancellation of election results. The "transition" period and today's 
insurgency are the results of cancelled elections. 
Today in Algeria more than 60 percent of the population was born after 
independence. The youth do not feel the same respect for the FLN as do older 
citizens. When oil prices crashed in the mid 1980s, Algeria suffered 
tremendously. Hydrocarbons make up as much as 98 percent of Algeria's 
vii 
exports. For every $1 change in the price of a barrel of oil, Algeria's current 
account balance changed by $500 million a year. Worse yet, in 1986 the dollar 
lost 40 percent of its value against European currencies, the same currencies 
whose countries Algeria depended on for two-thirds of its imports. 
Revenue-sharing expectations were dashed after the price crash, and the 
growing separation between the rich and poor became more aggravated. The 
riots had nothing to do with democracy or political Islam, but they had 
everything to do with relative deprivation and growing anger. 
After the riots, the state could have continued to operate in the same 
fashion. Those in power, President Chadli Bendjedid in particular, chose the road 
of reform. This may have been an attempt to spread the blame for the poor 
economic and social conditions, but research suggests there was also a genuine 
desire for reform. 
The Islamists had the ability to coalition-build, using the mosques 
extensively for organizational and campaign matters. Outside funding from Saudi 
Arabia and elsewhere enabled the FIS to make good on some earlier promises. 
The success of the FIS was based on various reasons, including a desire by some 
Algerians to see an Islamic Republic of Algeria. Others used a vote for FIS as a 
protest against the FLN, or were swayed by good deeds, campaign rhetoric, and 
good advertising. 
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One need only to read the headlines to see what extremist Algerian radicals 
(most, if not all of whom were associated with the FIS) are doing to their fellow 
Algerian citizens and foreigners in the name of God and the Nation of Algeria. 
The regime remains committed to reforms and multi-party politics, but will not 
allow recognition of political parties based solely on religion. 
H. 0. Hirschman's theory of changing intolerence of income inequality fits 
the Algerian case. This thesis is based on interviews and research. 
The United States should support the secular government during this 
transition period. The support needs to be accompanied by admonishment for 
human rights violations if necessary, and observers and assistance for free and 
fair elections once stability is restored. 
ix 
I. INTRODUCI10N 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's September 1993 comment on the 
United States and foreign affairs could well have been attributed to Algeria's 
leaders on the eve of their first multi-partied elections, 'We have arrived at 
neither the end of history nor a clash of civilizations, but a moment of immense 
democratic and entrepreneurial opportunity, and we must not waste it."1 
Unfortunately, Algeria's first democratic experience was by all accounts a 
short one. The important point is that the opportunity was not totally wasted. 
The memory is still fresh. Yet why did the military and the National Liberation 
Front (FLN) ruling elite resort to martial law and the de facto suspension of the 
1989 Algerian Constitution? The startling successes of the Front Islamic de Salut 
(FIS, or Islamic Salvation Front) in the 1990 and 1991 elections surprised local and 
international observers alike. A review of some of the political science literature 
reveals almost giddy excitement for this example of "fast track" democracy. It 
may be too soon to make predictions about the return of "democracy" to Algeria. 
Rather, the focus of this thesis will be on the origins of the reforms, the 
suspension of the electoral process, the transition period, and possible U.S. policy 
options. 
1
"Today's quote," Washington Times, September 22, 1993, p. 9. 
1 
The author suggests the state was facing a period of both economic and 
political crisis. The 1988 riots were not a call for democracy per se, but a call for 
liberalization and equality and an end to perceived corruption in the government. 
President Chadli Bendjedid's response could be seen as an opportunistic on~; and 
maybe even a naive one as well. Before the whole experience is dismissed as a 
fluke, the following should be considered: first, as Fouad Ajami suggests, 
"civilizations don't control states, states control civilizations."2 (Breaking this 
down one step further than Ajami's discussion of the "state" level: individual 
state actors can determine the direction of the Algerian "civilization", although the 
Algerian population as a whole should not be underestimated.) Second, the FIS 
benefitted from, and took advantage of, the reforms. They didn't initiate the 
reforms. 
It is often said that history repeats itself. Perhaps then Algeria is and was 
ripe for yet another revolution. The magazines and newspapers continually 
report of Algeria on the brink of disaster. The comparisons that can be made 
between the "first" and "second" Battles of Algiers are numerous. Over time it 
appears the FLN changed its role, decisively or unwittingly, from that of the 
liberator to the repressor. If history does repeat itself, then maybe the struggle 
2Fouad Ajami, 'The Summoning," Foreign Affairs Vol. 72 No.4 September/October 
1993, p. 9. For example, the whole issue of human rights has its "cultural bias" 
detractors. Torture is not just a Middle East pastime. As Amnesty International points 
out, torture was "virtually eradicated in Algeria between 1989 and 1991." Amnesty 
International Report "Algeria, Deteriorating Human Rights Under the State of 
Emergency," AI Index MOE 28/04/93, p. 2. 
2 
was (and is) really between the elitist francophones (who supposedly were the 
Algerian nationalists) and the rising and disgruntled Algerian Islamists. This 
argument is not valid in the long rw1, since both the Islamists and the FLN are 
products of the French colonial system; both groups use French, and both groups 
direct their hostilities to France when convenient (even though France supported 
the FLN against the FIS). The bottom line sometimes is that power corrupts- pure 
and simple. More likely, however, was the failure of the FLN to coalition-build 
at the same time they were liberalizing; the FLN is and was not monolithic. The 
laws which permitted the existence of "free mosques," although not an uncommon 
phenomenon in the 1 fiddle East, unwittingly facilitated the organization of, and 
support for, well-organized opposition. 
Was the regime really intent on reform, or was this an attempt to spread the 
blame for the declining socio-economic conditions? It seems the intention to 
"democratize" was an earnest one. The political actors on the Algerian stage are 
varied, and they certainly do not represent any monolithic ideology. Far from 
this, all factions (FLN, FIS, military ... ) were split along various and sometimes 
fuzzy lines. Recent history demonstrates how the FIS as a "front" could probably 
not join forces and agree on a clear vision for an Islamic Republic of Algeria. 
Also, the military reportedly is split between Islamists and secularists, and within 
the secularists between eradicators and conciliators. 
How does Algeria's history of colonization affect the later democratization 
experience? It's worthy of a corollary investigation, but there's no causal 
3 
connection between the past and the recent electoral experience. Islam did, 
however, provide a "refuge of collective identity for Algerians, and Islamic 
sentiment was a constant source of anti-colonial resistance."3 The importance of 
the colonial history must not be underestimated. Although most Algerians were 
born after independence, there is a constant, collective memory of what Algeria 
had to endure in order to gain independence. 
And finally, how can the FIS be adequately judged concerning their 
democratic intentions or lack thereof? The conflicting information collected could 
represent one of two generalizations. First, the non-threatening "soft sell" material 
used by the FIS was just a ruse to cover the more challenging possible outcomes 
for not only fellow Algerians, but also for concerned Western observers. Second, 
the mixed messages merely demonstrated the dilemma that there was no real 
shared notion of what the Islamic Republic would or should actually look like. 
Early support from Iran didn't necessarily help the image of the FIS. 
This thesis examines the political, economic, and social conditions leading 
up to the 1988 riots, the "democratic experience" and the subsequent suspension 
and period of "transition". The role of the military is of extreme importance, and 
therefore warrants consideration as well. As for the international arena, special 
attention will be paid to the role of Algeria in world politics, including Desert 
Storm. And finally, what role should the United States play? 
3Robert Mortimer, "Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria," Middle East Journal, Vo. 
45, No. 4, Autumn, 1991, p. 575. 
4 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. PRE-ISLAMIC HISTORY 
The indigenous North African Berbers' history can be traced back to 6430 
B.C. The cave paintings found in the Hoggar and Tassisi N' Ajjar regions (1,500 
kilometers south of Algiers) recorded the lives of the earliest Berbers. John 
Entelis suggests sailors from Crete had established depots along Algeria's 
shoreline as early as 2000 B.C. When the Phoenician traders came, their trading 
posts " ... constituted one of the earliest known cases of merchant empire building; 
the colonization set a pattern for North Africa .... "4 
Carthage was founded in 814 B.C. Intermarriage between the Berber chiefs 
and Punic aristocracy was not uncommon. The long Punic wars resulted in the 
destruction of Carthage by the Romans in 416 B.C. Berbers are considered to be 
Caucasoid; incidents of blond hair and blue eyes attest to that. Although the 
Romans ruled for 650 years, the Berbers did not really "assimilate." The Punic 
language was preserved, (a Semitic language) which later made Arabization a 
little easier during the Arab conquest. 
The Berber language is primarily a spoken language. Related to Arabic, it 
is more likely Hamitic than Semitic. If so, this means Berber is closer to Somali 
and Pharaonic Egyptian. Currently only the Tuareg Berbers use the ancient 
4John P. Entelis, Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1986) p. 7. 
5 
Berber alphabet known as Tifinaq to record their language. The use of Arabic 
script, however, is commonplace. The name Berber is also of questionable origin. 
Most scholars agree it originated from a derogatory Greek word meaning "non-
Greek" later translated in Latin and Arabic to barbarian. The Berbers don't use 
this word to refer to themselves, preferring Amazigh which means free, or noble 
men.5 
With the Romans came Latin, yet the vast majority of Berbers failed to 
assimilate Latin or Christianity. Those who did accept Christianity were 
disillusioned with Latin hierarchical domination. The Donatist heresy reflected 
this trouble. Donatus and his followers used this split from traditional 
Christianity as a form of political protest!' This is quite interesting, since the 
native inhabitants behave similarly once Islam reaches North Africa. This is not 
to say the Berbers should be considered natural heretics, but the literature doesn't 
discount this tendency. Although they joined a universal religion, they found a 
way to express themselves. 
During this period there were several Berber kingdoms, most notable was 
Masinissa's Kingdom of Numidia. Considered by historians to be not only a 
5Peter Mansfield, The Arabs (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 37-38, and John 
Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992) p. 9. 
*'Robert Rinehart, "Historical Setting," Algeria: A Country Study, Harold D. Nelson, ed., 
4th ed. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986) p. 10. Saint Augustine was 
a Romanized Berber. He preached against the threat of Donatism, among other things. 
His book, The City of God is still widely read. 
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conqueror, but also an agronomist, economist, linguist, religious reformer, and 
philosopher. His son carried on the unity of the kingdom, but was not as 
successful. The kingdom became a Roman vassal-state. Masinissa's grandson 
Jugurtha tried to take back the kingdom from the Romans, but was betrayed by 
his rival, the Berber King Bocchus I of Mauritania and was turned over to the 
Romans. He was strangled in a Roman prison in 105 B.C. Some believe he's the 
first "Algerian" resistance fighter, which makes him a r · 1nal hero to Berbers, in 
particular? 
According to Rinehart, the extended family was the basic unit of socidl and 
political organization among the Berbers. Families were bound by clans, and the 
clans formed tribes. For mutual defense the tribes formed confederations. Kings 
adapted Punic and Greek ceremonial forms. Although many Roman landlords 
and Latinized Berbers worked the Algerian land for grain export to Europe, just 
as many returned to the hinterland to become "retribalized" Berbers. 
The Berbers host a few more invasions before the Arab conquest. The 
Vandals and the Byzantines would both attempt to claim the region. 
B. THE ARAB CONQUEST 
Unlike previous raiders, the Arabs came as missionaries and conquerors, not 
as colonists. The Berbers resisted for some time, and can boast of a legendary 
female resistance fighter, al Kahina. Under her leadership, the Arabs were held 
off for several more years. Shortly after she was killed in battle, the Berbers 
7Entelis, pp. 6-10. 
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embraced Islam and quickly joined the ranks of the Arab armies for further 
conquests.8 
Why would such a resistant group of people so willingly embrace Islam? 
According to Entelis, it all goes back to the Carthaginian heritage: 
However Hellenic its outward features, the Punic state had been 
essentially oriental, and many of its customs had taken root in North Africa. 
Arabic is related to the Hamitic tongue spoken by the Berbers. The 
invading Arabs were close to the Berbers in other ways as well. Both 
groups, for example, possessed lifestyles based on movement, plunder, and 
pastoral nomadism. Finally, the Berber tendency to heresy must have made 
Islam appealing .... 9 
Although the Berbers embraced Islam, they did not embrace the dictatorial 
rule of the Arabs. As a means of political protest, they in large part adopted 
schismatic sects of the Muslim faith. Kharijism, (n egalitarian form of Islam 
which advocates God's authority as supreme, and that successors to the Prophet 
should be chosen based on merit, and that non-Arabs could be caliphs) was the 
route followed by many. 
The Ottoman period allowed the Algerian elite to keep the Turks somewhat 
at a distance, as long as financing for the military Janissaries was taken care of at 
the local level. The famous period of the Barbary pirates took care of much of 
this financing. Local chiefs were allowed to take care of their people in 
accordance with customary laws and traditions. 
8Reinhart, pp. 12-13. 
"Entelis, p. 13. 
8 
C. THE FRENCH CONQUEST OF ALGIERS 
Algeria's ties with France go back to the days of Charles X, Hussein Dey, 
and folklore of flyswatters and insults. Even if Hussein Dey called the French 
consul a "wicked, faithless, idol-worshipping rascal",10 most sources agree the 
French were looking for an excuse to occupy regardless. Algiers was captured on 
5 July, 1830. 
Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, Algeria was not a French protectorate. Algeria 
was annexed by France, then colonized and "civilized," eventually becoming an 
integral part of France. The French policies over the 132 year period 
systematically destroyed or repressed the traditional elite. The French colonists 
(colons, or pied noir) were French citizens, while the indigenous people were 
merely French subjects. 
1. Economic Conditions 
Similar in many respects to the Palestinian example, the iugerians were 
the victims of unfair taxation schemes, and sweeping land reform measures. 
Tribal lands were confiscated. Rinehart reports, ''In 1909, for instance, Muslims, 
who made up almost 90 percent of the population but produced only 20 percent 
1
'Rinehart, pp. 29-30. It's interesting to note that prior to this in 1794, the U.S. 
Congress decided to fund construction of warships to counter the threat to U.S. 
merchant ships posed by Algiers. In 1797, the U.S. signed a treaty with Algiers, agreeing 





of Algeria's income, paid 70 percent of direct taxes and 45 percent of the total 
taxes collected."11 
Attempts to introduce the notion of private land failed miserably, and 
unintentionally encouraged corruption of the tribal leadership. The colons did 
well since their exports were geared for the French market (wine, citrus, olives, 
vegetables). The cereal production and stock raising found in the traditional 
sector did not do as well.12 
2. Political Conditions 
Algeria was divided into various regions depending on whether the 
population had a French/European majority (communes de plein exercise) or a 
European minority (communes mixtes). The southern area remained under military 
control. The European majority districts were based on the French model, and 
had a mayor and a municipal council. The predominantly Muslim communities 
were headed by French officials, and local Muslim leaders were appointed or 
elected. 
Muslim intermediaries became known contemptuously as Beni-oui-oui, 
or yes-men. The administration policies further eroded any semblance of 
traditional elites, yet attempts at reform by the French government led to strong 
objections by the colons. French citizenship was denied to the Muslims, yet the 
11/bid., 41-42 PP· · 
l2Jbid. 
10 
Cremieux Decrees automatically conferred French citizenship upon the whole 
Algerian Jewish community. 
After an uprising in 1871, Muslim areas were placed under exceptional 
rule. Due process was denied, more land was confiscated, and new offenses 
(such as unauthorized assembly and insolence) not punishable under French law 
were devised for the Algerians (muslims). The result was " ... a sort of human dust 
on which we have no influence."13 
3. Social Conditions 
French cultural assimilation could be called civilizing, or it could be 
called cultural genocide. In many respects the period of French rule not only 
severed Algeria's traditional institutions, but it stunted and confused the process 
of nationalism and Algerian identity. This was not an accident. Leroy-Beaulieu, 
a nineteenth century advocate of cultural assimilation and colonialism, stated that 
... the way to dominate a people is to assimilate it, to seize the youth in its 
infancy .... The knowledge of the Koran is disappearing in Algeria; it must not 
be revived; it is a book full of bellicose exhortations against infidels and 
includes thousands of texts that can be used against us .... 14 
This quote in many ways has relevance in explaining the FLN's later 
fears of the FIS. At the risk of stretching a metaphor, the following is offered. 
Politics in the Middle East almost always seems to showcase two kinds of 
13Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: Penguin Books, 
1979) pp. 33-37. 
14Quoted in David C. Gordon, North Africa's French Legacy: 1954- 1962 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1962) p. 11. 
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"legitimacy" trump cards: the liberators (or nationalists, and sometimes even 
colonizers) and the Islamists (or those who claim religiosity). In the hierarchy of 
Middle East political card games, religious authenticity and virtue attempt to 
outbid those holding the secular (and sometimes marked) cards of nationalists. 
Leroy-Beaulieu knew this, and so did Madani and Belhaj (FIS leaders). 
The assimilation process coupled with the disruption of the indigenous 
traditional elite left the French in a quandary; they had successfully destabilized 
Algeria to the point of having no trustworthy interlocuteurs valables, and a nation 
of "evolved ones", or 'evolues, who were neither French nor Algerian. The offer 
of French citizenship to a few (25,000 out of six million) not only upset the colons, 
but would have meant apostasy for the Muslims. Maurice Violette pushed for 
reforms, but was met with opposition: 
When Muslims protest, you are indignant; when they approve, you are 
suspicious; when they keep quiet, you are fearful. Messieurs, these men 
have no political nation. They do not even demand their religious nation. 
All that they ask is to be admitted into yours. If you refuse this, beware lest 
they do not soon create one for themselves.15 
D. THE RISE OF ALGERIAN NATIONALISM AND NEW ELITES 
In response to the colonizing actions of the nineteenth century and the 
dismantling of traditional elites and institutions, Algeria experienced the 
emergence of new elites. Time was marching on for France's Algerian 
experiment, and there was no denying that world events coupled with French 
15Quoted in Home, p. 37. 
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policies would not go on without response. The traditional elites were replaced 
by three "types" of separate and unique nationalist movements. The remnants of 
these movements (or perhaps the influence oO could ~ seen during the heyday 
of multi-party politics between 1989 and 1991. 
Several preconditions metit discussion in order to understand these 
movements. The French education policy of "evolving" and assimilation led to 
Muslim conscription in the French army alongside the colons. This was not well-
received by the colons. Any actions towards equ~ty upset the settlers to no end. 
Regardless, the experience of World War I gave credence to the song, ''How ya 
going to keep 'em down on the farm after they've seen Paris?" Nearly 200,000 
Algerian Muslims fought for France; 25,000 of them lost their lives.•., 
Many Algerians did not "stay on the farm" and moved to France to find 
work and a better life. Exposed to Arab nationalism literature and thought, seeds 
of nationalist aspirations were planted. There was also a cruel irony in much of 
the French educational materials: Algerians learned about liberty and the nobility 
of revolt by studying the French Revolution! According to Home, "At their best, 
French schools provided an admirable breeding ground for revolutionary 
minds."17 
Three nationalist groups developed in response to the dissatisfaction with 
the status quo. They by no means represented a united front, and were probably 
1
"Entelis, p. 25. 
17Home, p. 61. 
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more divided because of the previously mentioned destruction of traditional 
institutions. The three movements were those of liberal assimilation, led by 
Ferhat Abbas, Islamic reformism embodied by Abdelhamid Ben Badis, and 
Messali Hadj's radical anticolonial nationalism. 111 
1. Liberal Assimilation 
Ferhat Abbas represented the evolved, assimilated Algerians who had 
fared well under the system. Assimilationists were francophones, and truly 
admired all that was French- except of course the feeling of inequality. The 
assimilationist position evolved from initially wanting to be integrated fully into 
French society (citizenship without apostasy), to a drive for independence (while 
loosely associated with France). 
Abbas did not initially believe there really was such a thing as an 
Algerian national identity. Until after World War II, his rationale was based on 
the following: 
Had I discovered an Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and I 
would not blush as if I had committed a crime .... However, I will not die for 
an Algerian nation, because it does not exist. I have not found it. I have 
examined History, I questioned the living and the dead, I visited cemeteries; 
nobody spoke to me about it. I then turned to the Koran and I sought for 
one solitary verse forbidding a Muslim from integrating himself with a non-
Muslim nation. I did not find that 
either. One cannot build on the wind.19 
18Entelis, p. 36. 
19Quoted in Entelis, p. 38. 
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By 1943, Abbas and others drafted the Manifesto of the Algerian 
People, calling for the creation of the Algerian state (associated with France), land 
reform, equality, and free education. This evolved into the Friends of the 
Manifesto and Uberty organization (AML). The AML was banned, and Abbas 
was imprisoned following the May 1945 massacre in Setif. What started out as 
aV-E day celebration led to a nationalistic demonstration that got out of hand. 
Dozens of helpless colons were killed. The French (army, police and vigilante 
settlers) response was to kill thousands of ~1uslims.20 
It seems that later the lessons of liberal assimilation were best learned 
by the predominantly Berber political parties, the Rally for Culture and 
Democracy (RCD) and the Socialist Front Forces (Fr. FFS). By this, the Berbers 
in a way have "assimilated" that which is both Muslim and Arab. What better 
way for a minority group to gain access to the political system than to join it? 
The very same thing was expressed about the French by Abbas. The same cou1d 
be said by the FIS lslamists, but there's an important difference here. Tllis may 
be too simplistic, but it seems the Berbers were looking to transcend ethnic 
cleavages through broader acceptance, while the FIS sought power and wanted 
to narrow compliance and behavior. The motivation is totally different. 
20lbid., pp.39-40. The final tally - 103 settler deaths, over 6000 Muslim deaths. 
Additional provocation came by the unfurling of the green and white banner which was 
made famous earlier by the legendary hero Abd el-Kader, considered the first Algerian 
nationalist. The Palestinian parallels are obvious; symbolism carries a lot of weight in 
this region. 
15 
2. Islamic Reformism 
The realities of European technological and organizational superiority 
realized by many Algerians after World War I led to the desire to return to the 
past. The memory of a perfect and puritanical Islam may be a flawed premise, 
but it was convincing for many including Abdelhamid Ben Badis. The goal was 
to reassert, in an individual manner, the Islamic-Arab heritage of Algerians.:!1 
In 1931 Ben Badis created the Association of Algerian Ulema. Its motto: "Islam 
is my Religion, Arabic is my Language, Algeria is my Country."22 
Ben Badis and his followers did a lot for the struggle of Algerian 
identity; almost in spite of their intentions. Their focus was on religion (ridding 
Algeria of Sufi orders, marabouts, and religious brotherhoods) but the corollary 
effects included the formation of religious schools and the promotion of ideas of 
Algerian unity (Berber/ Arab) that led to a new feeling of national consciousness. 
These religious schools would later be the training ground for future Islamists like 
Abbassi Madani, "He received a classical Muslim education (Kuttab) and courses 
21 This Islamic revivalism was inspired by the Salifiyya (forefather) ideology which 
originated in Egypt. The problem with North Africa was not Islam, but the corruption 
of Islam. This is pointed out later during the election period as well. The problem was 
not with Islam, but with how the "state" tried to corner the market on their own 
interpretation of Islam. 
22Quoted in Entelis, p. 42. It's not surprising that Algeria's current Constitution 
begins with these fundamental principles of the Republic, "Algeria is a popular, 
democratic state. Islam is the state religion and Arabic is the official national language." 
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in theology first at Sidi Okba, and then at Biskra where his family moved in 
1941..."2..1 
Anyway, this national consciousness was by no means compatible with 
the ideas of Abbas. Ben Badis rebutted Abbas' writings on the absence of an 
Algerian nation with a history lesson of his own: 
History has taught us that the Muslim people of Algeria were created 
like all others. They have their history, illustrated by noble deeds; they have 
their culture, their customs, their habits with all that is good and bad in 
them. The Muslim population is not France, it cannot be France, it does not 
want to be France .... lt possesses its fatherland whose frontiers are fixed, and 
this is the Algerian fatherland.24 
3. Radical Anticolonial Nationalism 
The third variety of Algerian nationalism is that of the militant and 
separatist Messali Hadj. The development of an Algerian semiproletariat class 
was attributed to, among other things, a high Muslim birthrate, the increase of 
casual day labor (replacing sharecroppers) and unemployed males, and the 
influence of French workers on those Algerians working in France. 
The North African Star (ENA- Etoile Nord Africaine) was created in 
Paris, 1926. Formed in order to protect the "material, moral, and social interests" 
of Muslim North African workers, the group quickly evolved under the 
leadership of Messali Hadj. By 1927 ENA was calling for the independence of 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, property confiscation from colons, the creation of 
23Francois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa, (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1993) p. 275. 
~uoted in Entelis, p. 44. 
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a national army, and the removal of all French troops.25 Needless to say, this was 
not well-received by the French authorities. 
Imprisoned and later released, Messali went to Switzerland to 
contemplate and modify his marxist-based philosophy. When he returned to 
Algeria in 1937 he formed the Algerian People's party (PPA- Parti du Peuple 
Algerien). This ideology seemed to be just the right blend of massed-based 
nationalist socialism and Islamic ideology. However, this too was not to last. 
Still attempting to be a "legal" party of sorts, it was too repressed by the French 
government to be very effective. Messali then formed (after another stint in 
prison) the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (Fr. MTLD). This 
group also worked within "the system" although it produced impatient activists. 
(The same could be said later about the FI5- the majority of the campaign work 
was above board, the "impatient ones" conducted more secretive work.) 
The Special Organization (Fr. OS) was formed as an alternative 
clandestine organization for the impatient ones. Instead of solidifying the move 
for independence, this dual set-up evolved into a two-headed monster: the 
ideology of the MTLD clashed with the violent notions of the OS. The French 
secret service discovered the OS in 1950. Messali was arrested again, but this 
time he was also deported to France, remaining there through most of the 
struggle for independence. Entelis comments on the eventual demise of the two 
groups: 
2."Jbid., p. 46. 
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The combination of ... an inarticulate ideology, a cult of personality 
leadership, organizational splits between overt and covert operations, 
political divisions involving Messali and the centralists, and the growing 
impatience of a revolutionary generation more predisposed to using force 
and violence- made conventional political discourse within the French 
constitutional framework outdated and irrelevant."2" 
The problems delineated by Entelis led to internecine killings- a point 
to ponder since this will not be the last time this happens. Many Algerians will 
go on to kill their fellow Algerians; before, during, and after their struggle for 
independence. Just as the Palestinians suspected of collusion with the Israelis are 
killed by fellow Palestinians, the lines of acceptable behavior seem to always blur. 
There are few monolithic national views, but the moral issues of fratricide should 
not be brushed aside as acceptable collateral damage during any period of 
transition. Today again Algeria is faced with the tragedy of fratricide even as this 
paper is being written. The government and the reporters call them "terrorists," 
but they are also Algerians. 
E. THE BATTLE FOR INDEPENDENCE, 1954-1962 
Desperate times lead to desperate measures. The groups described above 
led by their new elites had their turn at working with France to liberate Algeria, 
now it was time for another approach. Ahmed Ben Bella (Algeria's first president 
after independence) and eight others formed a new group, the Revolutionary 
Committee for Unity and Action (Fr. CRUA). CRUA comprised the nine historic 
26fbid., p. 48. 
19 
"chiefs" of the revolution. Renouncing past nationalist rivalries, they focused 
instead on the violent overthrow of French colonial rule. 
1. The Early Years 
The revolutionary committee split their operations into "internal" and 
"external" groups. The internal groups divided Algeria into six regions with 
primary and secondary leadership assigned. The externals were based in Cairo. 
On All Saints Day 1 November, 1954, the revolution began in the name of Front 
de Liberation Nationale (FLN). But there was no spontaneous spread of a mass 
revolution. As history shows us time and again, organizational skills are an asset 
during periods of revolution. The first stage leaders seemed to be perhaps more 
interested in a quick start that would assure their spot in the history books. 
By 1955 it was clear that the revolutionaries needed to do some 
coalition-building with the other, more established political groups. (Messali was 
not impressed with the revolution, and had formed yet another group Movement 
National Algerien (MNA) to oppose the FLN.) By 1956 some liberals (Ferhat Abbas 
included), a few militants from the ulama, and radicals from MTLD had joined 
forces with the FLN. Therefore, in addition to the masses, several elites joined the 
unified effort. 27 
Ben Bella seemed to be placing the externals above the internals, and 
the Congress of the Soumann was convened to settle a few of these organizational 
27William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968 (Cambridge: 
The M.I.T. Press, 1969) pp. 96-98. 
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problems. According to Quandt, the outcome condemned the "cult of 
personality." 
The Platform principles: 
1. Primacy of the interior over the exterior. 
2. Primacy of the political over the military. 
3. Collegial decision-making.28 
If there were problems with number three, the French government 
provided a back-handed assist when they kidnapped Ben Bella and four others 
of the historic "nine" in an airplane bound for Tunis. The pilot was French. 
The next decisions to call an eight-day Muslim strike and the Battle of 
Algiers were the results of the revolutionary- politician coalition. Yet they were 
still not able to successfully lead the war of independence. Who were the new 
contenders? 
2. The Military and the Intellectuals 
The "theft" of the FLN's top leadership coupled with the massive 
retaliation by the French to the urban warfare necessitated the inclusion of two 
more groups- the military and the intellectuals. These people generally were 
younger than the revolutionaries and the politicians, and their initial willingness 
to follow the senior leadership was more likely due to a lack of ideology than 
anything. All they really knew was they wanted an independent Algeria. 
28lbid., p. 100. 
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The military provided a fast track for advancement during the middle 
years of the war in particular. Quandt studied their socialization and 
background; discovering many similarities with the revolutionaries. The biggest 
difference? According to Quandt, "Whereas the Revolutionaries felt strongly that 
they alone should guide the revolution, the militaires in general lacked the strong 
sense of personal ambition for power. "19 And finally, the military gained 
influence as a whole because of their warfare skills and monopoly over the means 
of violence. 
The intellectuals were not immune from violence (some served as 
guerrillas) but their role as technicians was paramount. Doctors, engineers, 
lawyers, journalists, women nurses, students and teachers constituted the majority 
of the intellectuals. Their backgrounds were similar to the politicians, yet they 
lacked early political participation. The intellectuals brought administrators and 
theoreticians to the FLN. Most importantly, they broadened and legitimized the 
FLN power base.30 
3. The Authority Crisis- Who's in Charge? 
Frantz Fanon believed that there was therapeutic value for the act of 
participation in violent activities. In his book, The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon 
went one step further to predict: 
29/bid., p. 113. 
30/bid., pp. 115-124. 
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But it so happens that for the colonized people this violence, because 
it constitutes their only work, invests their characters with positive and 
creative qualities. The practice of violence binds them together as a whole, 
since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the 
great organism of violence which has surged upward in reaction to the 
settler's violence in the beginning. The groups recognize each other and the 
future nation is already indivisible.31 
Indivisible is perhaps the wrong word. The last several years of the 
war were marked by questions of authority and legitimacy. (These same questions 
would plague the 1988 protesters.) A provisional government (Fr GPRA) was 
formed in 1958. There was much infighting, strangely enough the disagreements 
were more personal power struggles than ideology struggles. 
Moving to 1959, France's De Gaulle pulled what could be called a 
"Nixon in China" 32 move. However, this was not well received by the French 
army or by the colons. More blood was spilt, and the negotiations finally paid off. 
Algeria was declared independent on 5 July 1962. 
31Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963) p. 93. 
32Just as the anti-communist Nixon surprised many with his visit to China, De Gaulle 
seemed very set on keeping French Algeria- until his speech that opened the path for 
Algerian self-determination. (See Horne pp. 344-346.) 
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III. THE ONE-PARTY STATE, 1962-1989 
Power struggles ensued; instead of forging a new political elite, the 
revolution left few leaders who were willing to compromise. It's interesting to 
note that the new independent regime was quite willing to initially accept the 
French law as the basis for its legality. So the colonial system was dismantled 
while the existing legal system was kept in place. 
A. AHMED BEN BELLA 
Algeria's first independent leader quickly consolidated his power base by 
discrediting or diffusing potential opposition, working instead with "numerous 
clans, factions, and cliques, none of which [had] power enough to dominate the 
entire system."33 Fanon's vision of an indivisible nation was far from the truth. 
Ben Bella faced a considerable economic and social disaster- the European 
exodus left the country at a standstill. Unemployment was perhaps as high as 70 
percent. Ben Bella was compelled to imposed emergency austerity measures. Yet 
in a way Algeria inherited a large boost- much of the land was cultivated, 
buildings and infrastructure already ripe for state monopolies, and the 
hydrocarbon contribution was particularly beneficial. SONATRACH formed as 
a holding company for the state's interests in the hydrocarbons sector. The state 
incorporated a workers' management system known as autogestion to support the 
33Quandt, p. 11. 
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first notions of "Algerian socialism." Within a year, Ben Bella was not only the 
President, but also the Secretary-General of the FLN, Commander-in-chief, Head 
of State, and Head of Govemment14 
His dictatorial tendencies got the best of him, and he left office due to a 
"bloodies~ coup" complements of his Minister of Defense, Colonel Boumedienne. 
As fate would have it, Ben Bella returns to the forefront from exile after the 1988 
riots. The "dictatorial" Ben Bella must have mellowed over the years. According 
to one report, Ben Bella stated (Oct. 6, 1988), "Algeria is hungry and thirsty. We're 
not only short of wheat but also of democracy. We are hungry and thirsty for 
democracy, hungry for freedom of expression."35 
B. HOURARI BOUMEDIENNE 
The Boumedienne era was a period of rapid industrialization and agrarian 
reform. (The landed elite were displeased by the 1971land reform measures.) The 
1q73 oil price surge perhaps ballooned Boumedienne's head as well. Algeria was 
viewed by many as an inspirational example of self-determination. Boumedienne 
liked the soapbox position he held, and he used it frequently to lecture the 
"West." 
34Rinehart, pp. 74-83. 
35(Sounded like he was hungry for sound bites.) Quoted in FBIS-NE5-88-195 "Former 
President Ben Bella Calls for Democracy" 7 Oct. 1988, p. 10. 
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The FLN was marginalized during this period; many leaders were silenced, 
murdered, imprisoned, or exiled. The military and the "technocrats" gained more 
influence at others' expense. The economic system in place started to widen the 
gap between classes. A blind eye was turned away from the poverty as many of 
the privileged enjoyed the perks of a corrupt system; dismissed by Boumedienne 
as the "nomenklatura's honey."-16 
As Cheriet points out, the 1976 National Charter and Constitution set the 
stage for future unrest. The call for Islam as the state religion opened a door for 
the lslamists, and socialism was falling short of its equality for women. After his 
sudden death in 1978, it was the beginning of the end for a legitimate successor 
regime.37 Boumedienne died unexpectedly due to a rare blood disease in 1978. 
C. CHADLI BENDJEDID 
Emerging from the military comer, Bendjedid was relatively unknown. His 
nomination was in part made to smooth over a divided FIN congress. Bendjedid 
embarked on a mission of flexibility and liberalization. He encouraged 
privatization and foreign invesbnent, yet backed off of Boumedienne' s heavy 
industry projects (some say this was quite detrimental, blaming Bendjedid for not 
understanding the need for infant industry protection). 
3bFrancis Ghiles, "Algeria Locked in a Vicious Cycle of Violence," Middle East 
International, 9 July, 1993, p. 18. 
37Boutheina Cheriet, "The Resilience of Algerian Populism," Middle East Report, Jan-
Feb 1992, p. 13. 
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Still relying on the three pillars (state, army, and party), Bendjedid 
implemented reforms which exacerbated the economic and social structure. The 
oil crash of 1986 in essence left the state in a situation where it was no longer able 
to properly meet the demands of the "social contract" with its citizens. The gap 
between the haves and have-nots was widening. (See Chapter V for the economy.) 
It seemed like one hand didn't know what the other was doing. Attempts to push 
for Arabization upset the Berber community, the family law bill passed in 1984 
was at loggerheads with women who thought they might be equal partners in the 
"democratic, popular, modern, Socialist Islamic republic."38 Bendjedid's Algeria 
was a political time bomb; too much, too fast. 
D. THE CRISIS OF 1988 
The economic reforms led to the dismantling of state corporations. This led 
to increased unemployment, mounting foreign debt and an increased reliance on 
food imports among other things. According to Mahfoud Bennoune, former 
Director of the Institute of Planning and Applied Economics, the crisis coincided 
with the first months of Bendjedid's second term in office- sparked by widespread 
rumors of corrupt activities of the President's family. On September 19, 
Bendjedid went on national television and admitted the government was near 
38Cheriet, p. 13. 
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bankruptcy, "He brazenly put the blame on everyone but himself.":w (By 
November he admits that 80 percent of the corporations he "reformed" were in 
the red, though.) 
In the "Second Battle of Algiers" anywhere from 160 to over a thousand 
people perished. 5 to 10 October, 1988 marked the riots that supposedly led to 
democracy. Khalid Duran looked at five areas of discontent to explain the riots: 
human rights, the economy, the bureaucracy, religious policy, and foreign 
affairs.40 It was not just "petrol and couscous". 
Duran includes the lack of a free press in the human rights but also focused 
on the use of torture (including minors). Specifically, when wounded 
demonstrators were brought to the hospitals, the police pursued. In the 
aftermath, 400 security personnel were said to have been punished for their 
behavior. Commenting on torture practice specifically, Duran states the influence 
of East German training was evidenced. 
Since independence the population of Algeria grew from nine million to 25 
million. As stated elsewhere, heavy industry was pursued at the expense of 
agriculture. There were not enough teachers to meet the demands of a growing 
~abeel Abraham, "Algeria's Facade of Democracy," Middle East Report, March-April, 
1990, p. 11. 
40See Khalid Duran, "The Second Battle of Algiers," Orbis, Summer 1989, pp. 403-421. 
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population. The status of women was particularly perplexing. The 1984 Family 
Law legislation included the following: 
•Article 7- fixed different ages for marriage (21 men, 18 women); 
• Article 8- polygamy within the limits of the Koran; 
,. Article 11- "the conclusion of the marriage for the woman is incumbent on 
her matrimonial tutor who is either he father or one of her close relatives.'141 
The Arabization process seemed to be merely a product of smoke and 
mirror bureaucracy. It was a program on paper that wasn't working. Algeria 
was unable to provide quality training in Arabic, yet it was forced on the 
population. That was, of course unless you were a top bureaucrat -then the 
children could receive the best French education available. 
Duran criticizes the older generation of bureaucrats for their lack of Arabic 
proficiency, noting that this group, " ... rich and clannish, uses the French language 
and apes the colonial manner, camouflaging ignorance with hauteur and 
incompetence with ideology.'142 Duran fails to comment on the French training 
of the Islamists, however. The bottom line is that the old guard was viewed as a 
thing of the past. Sixty percent of the population was born after independence. 
In 1988 the focus was "hey, I'm poor thanks to you, FLN" not "thanks for the 
liberation." 
41Burgat and Dowell, p. 258 fn. 
42Duran, pp. 410411. 
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Not unlike Israel's support for HAMAS, Algeria had been propping up the 
"Islamic" side of their national charter through token demonstrations that 
occasionally backfired. For instance, Muhammad al-Ghazali (formerly of Egypt's 
Muslim Brethren) was invited to come and teach at the University of Constantine 
as a ploy to keep the ful'\damentalists calm. However, he soon had a following. 
Ghazali's ideas were recycled and used as demands against the state. On the flip 
side, this appointment was used to point out the hypocrisy of the state's desire 
to keep away outside influence of "Algerian Islam.•t4..'l 
The non-aligned-yet-tilting-toward-USSR position was not that popular with 
most Algerians. As Duran states, " ... Algerians had developed a distaste for this 
policy, and this distaste influenced the October Revolt.'144 The distaste included 
for example, the positions taken over Morocco and the Western Sahara and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
4..
1Burgat and Dowell, p. 268 fn, "It is curious that they don't stop repeating to us that 
Algerian Islam should guard against outside influences .... and then they look for an 
Egyptian for us!" 
44Duran, p. 412. 
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IV. THE PERIOD OF REFORM 
Surprisingly, the "full" account of the October riots may not be out. One 
interview actually suggests the state had something to do with its initiation 
(beyond the economic disaster, that is). What is known is that this was a major 
event in Algeria. The violence was the worst since the war for independence. 
The military (not the police) was called up~ ·'1 to subdue the rioters. The resultant 
deaths and torture did more to separate the Algerian people from the legitimate 
rule of the FLN and its army than could ever be restored. 
A review of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) during and 
after the period of revolt is quite revealing. The gamut of reporting went from 
the amusing to the poignant. Although there wasn't much of anything to be 
amused about, the interview with YAR President Salih stressed the disturbances 
were "masterminded by hostile forces .... the chaos must have been orchestrated by 
imperialist and Zionist forces ... "45 
A rather ominous news announcement stated: 
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. To restore calm in our white city 
of Algiers, it is requested that citizens respect and not violate the 
instructions ... made public by the Military Command .... Discipline and calm 
are among the characteristics of a good Algerian citizen.4& 
45FBIS-NES-88-196, "Bendjedid Confers With Salah" 11 Oct. 1988, p. 11. Chalk one 
up for the conspiracy fans. 
4&FBIS-NE5-88-196, "Public Asked to Respect Military," 11 Oct. 1988, p. 9. 
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And finally the obtuse: 
Algiers today restored its vitality and cheerfulness by departments 
resuming their activities and life resuming its continuous movement through 
workers reporting to their posts and shops opening in complete safety and 
security. 47 
Bendjedid must have been a realist at this point. Given the crossroad 
options available, he took the high road and opted to reform as opposed. to 
repress. He must have known this was the only viable option available. The 
move toward reform and the opportunity for the Algerian citizens to express their 
"opinions" was made rapidly and with what could be called high hopes. By the 
time the November 3 referendum was held, the move to amend fourteen articles 
of the previous Constitution was a faite-accompli. 
The October riots led Bendjedid to seek out a spokesman or "representative" 
of sorts from the people in order to continue with some form of organized call for 
the "public opinion" he referred to earlier in his reform speech. The only group 
organized enough to meet the needs of widespread non-government connections 
were the Islamists- Abassi Madani, Ali Belhadj, and Mahfoud Nahnah in 
particular. 
Among other things (Prime Minister and National Assembly reforms) the 
major reforms of February 1989 involved the move to a multiparty system, and 
the freedom to form political associations. This included the right to form 
47FBIS-NE5-88-196, "life Returns to Normal," 11 Oct. 1988, p. 17. 
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Islamist political parties, something the neighbors in both Tunisia and Morocco 
didn't want to even think about. Although technically the 1989 law banned party 
formation which advocated intolerance or those formed along mainly confessional 
lines, this was overlooked during the party "build-up" stage. The true motivation 
for this "oversight" is still not known. According to a great quote from Bendjedid, 
his justification for the FIS: 
The activities of the Islamist party are submitted to precise rules. If 
they respect them, we cannot forbid them. We are Muslims and it is 
important for us to encourage Islam in its just conception, not the pseudo 
Islam of myths and extremism. If certain people do not look on this 
legalization kindly, that is their affair. For our part, it is not conceivable to 
apply democracy to Communists and to deprive the current which preaches 
spiritual belonging .... Democracy ... cannot be selective.48 
This quote sure sounds like Bendjedid' s intentions were honorable, at least 
at the start. However, others believe the hope was "the more, the merrier" leaving 
the FLN as the clear majority choice. Other reforms concerned respect for human 
rights and the abolition of torture, and a more open press.49 
.at~Burgat and Dowell,m p. 274. 
49An interesting "leftover" of the open press is the presence of personal ads in the 
papers. "First instituted in Algeria in 1989 with the country's democratic opening, 
personal ads have survived the pervasive censorship imposed since the military 
coup .... as political life has been shut down and unemployment has climbed to 50 percent 
among the young, newspapers have been flooded with bags of mail from those 
searching for a way out." Chris Hedges, "Looking For Love (Shh!) in Ads," The New York 
Times, Sec. IX, p. 3:1, 9 May 1993. 
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Bendjedid's opening led to the approval of over 30 political parties. The 
platforms and histories of all the parties are beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
the FIS merits additional attention. As stated earlier, Madani was the product of 
classical Muslim training, he was also the product of French secondary schooling 
and the war of independence as a member of CRUA. After independence, he 
continued his studies in psychology, philosophy, and education, receiving his PhD 
in London. Impressive as this all may be, Madani was to end up in and out of jail 
over the years. He's currently serving a 12 year sentence (with his partner 
Belhadj) for conspiring against state authority, causing harm to the economy, and 
distributing seditious tracts.50 
If Madani played the FIS soft-sell "good cop," his alter ego belonged to the 
fiery Ali Belhadj. According to Burgat, Belhadj was born in Tunis, and orphaned 
during the war of independence. His background education is exclusively 
religious, and he has quite the flair for dramatics. People who know him have 
also said he seems more like a mystic than a politician, and that he has a very 
distorted (if not caricature) view of the West since he's not a travelled man. 51 
~iddle East Watch/Lawyers Committee for Human Rights report on Algeria: 
"Lawyer Brahim Taouti, Active in Human Rights, Gets 3- Year Sentence; Two U.S.-Based 
Rights Groups Urge His Release," May 11,1993, p. 3. Later reports indicated that Madani 
and Belhadj would be released for Ramadan. Algerian Embassy personnel confirmed 
they are in fact still incarcerated. 
51Burgat and Dowell, p. 276. 
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Regardless, these two men fell in and out of favor during the period of political 
opening. 
A. THE MUNICIPAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS OF 1990 
As Arun Kapil stated, "The scale of the FLN defeat and FIS victory cannot 
be overstated."52 In his article he lists the various impressive figures, including 
a 54 percent national popular vote, and 854 of the 1,541 communal assemblies. 
This was very good considering the fact that there weren't even FIS candidates 
in 276 of the communes. The provincial elections were also decisive; the FIS took 
32 of the 48 wilaya assemblies. The only area the FLN held was in the south and 
east sections which were considered "home court" for FLN/military elite. The 
weakest area for the FIS was in Kayble (Berber region)- this area belonged to the 
RCD. Also, it would be interesting to see how this first round would have gone 
had the FFS not boycotted the elections. Many of those loyal to FFS cast their 
"protest votes" to the FIS. 
Did Bendjedid want the FIS to take a large enough piece of the pie to offset 
opponents to his own economic reforms? Probably not, but the thought may 
have crossed his mind. The period around tr ' elections was a divisive one for 
the FLN. H ever there were visible signs of splits and opposition, this was 
probably it. However, as far as elections go, this first round was pretty clean. 
52Arun Kapil, "Algeria's Elections Show Islamist Strength," Middle East Report, 
September-october 1990, p. 31. 
35 
The fact that husbands could cast votes for their wives is valid cause for a little 
scrutiny, but the large visible groups of women who supported the FIS casts 
doubts on the belief that all women would naturally be opposed to a FIS victory 
and all that it would entail. There were, however, groups of women who 
protested against the possibility of FIS control. 
B. THE NEXT STAGE- POLITICS AS USUAL? 
In the best political traditions, the first comments out of the mouths of 
politicians probably wouldn't have been cleared by their handlers. Prime 
Minister Hamrouche responded to the defeat, " ... our defeat attests even more to 
our desire for a democratic opening than would a victory in which one would 
have been suspected of irregularity."s..1 
The next step was to attempt to discredit the FIS. Some of these maneuvers 
backfired: as stated earlier, the French supported the "secular" FLN and feared the 
FIS. Both parties tried to capitalize on anti-French sentiment. The result was that 
the FLN lost its nationalist edge, but the FI5- Madani in particular- remained 
vilified by the French media. (Not unlike the backfire of anti-Rush Limbaugh 
"most dangerous man" nonsense, Madani's caption read "the man who frightens 
France."54) 
s..1Bourgat and Dowell, p. 283. 
54/bid., p. 282. 
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C. THE GULF WAR 
Prior to August 2, 1990, the FIS concerned itself with the FLN, but was also 
concerned with the moderate opposition parties and the issues of religion, 
segregation and dress. A third rivalry focused on the public sector-private 
enterprise chicken-before-the-egg economic debate. And finally, the whole 
Arabization debate was enough to keep anyone's attention divided. But after 2 
August, all bets were off. The crisis transcended political differences (at least for 
a while) and actually "... radicalized the international outlook of the younger 
generation and helped bridge the gap that had opened between those Algerians 
who remembered or took part in the national revolution and those born since 
independence ... "55 
Roberts suggests the message received by the lslamists is that they needed 
to expand and stay in touch with their constituency. What followed was a 
strange and delicate tightrope walk of international intrigue. Algeria was the first 
Arab state to condemn Saddam Hussein's actions. However, almost immediately 
the focus was shifted to Western meddling in Arab affairs. The FIS decided to get 
a leg up and so Madani and Belhadj went off to mediate. Madani skirted the 
issue by saying something like "too bad we have to have any borders between 
Arab nations." But Belhadj assumed a more aggressive role, finding fault with 
5~ugh Roberts, "A Trial of Strength: Algerian Nationalism," in Islamic 
Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James Piscatori, (Chicago: The Fundamentalism 
Project, 1991) pp. 132-133. 
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both parties. Meanwhile, Ben Bella makes another comeback performance- this 
time, however, he outflanks FIS with a very pro-Iraq position. Who represents 
the government of Algeria? The messages were mixed at best. 
On 18 January, 1991, Belhadj organized a huge demonstration, declared 
himself Minister of Defense, and tried to organize an army to go fight for 
Saddam. Two days later a headline read, "The Algerian Army and the War in the 
Gulf: A Lion When it Fights the Islamists, an Ostrich in Time of War."so By 21 
January 1991, Bendjedid made a speech to the National Assembly. Both sides (FIS 
and Ben Bella) were chastised for their "anarchistic agitation."57 
D. THELASTROUND-ASVSTHEAWMY 
Belhadj certainly hadn't positively influenced the Algerian military dwing 
his Gulf War escapades. The FIS was slightly weakened after the war, but had 
proved it could "mobilize the masses." The FLN regained some confidence, and 
went on with the business at hand- destabilizing the FIS. 1 April brought with 
it a new electoral law, provided for two rounds of voting, kind of a "winner take 
all." Also, the redistricting which took place heavily favored the south, where the 
FLN had a better chance of success. 
Other maneuvers were taking place on all sides. The mosques were banned 
for political use, the FIS in turn demanded stricter observance of Ramadan 
S(,Burgat and Dowell, p. 292. 
57Roberts, p. 141. 
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restrictions. The voting laws were changed again to restrict a husband for casting 
his wife's (or wives') vote(s), the FIS called for a general strike, etc .. 
By May 1991, Belhadj escalates: "The FIS has committed itseU to the 
immediate implementation of Islamic law and trying former Algerian officials if 
it wins the general elections scheduled for 27 June." And also: 
"We are going to catch all the thieves and sell everything they own to 
pay their debts. There will be no forgiveness. The ministers and the 
military will be tried for having killed and tortured Muslims."58 
One can imagine the warm reception this message had with the government. 
Martial law was declared on 5 June 1991. Foreign Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali 
(a technocrat who had previously been in charge of SONATRACH, the state-
owned oil and gas corporation) was next "in the barrel" as Prime Minister, 
replacing Hamrouche. The army had been tucked away since the 1988 riots. 
Now that it was back in full force, would the soldiers be all wound up with no 
place to go? Hardly. The crackdown which followed, although nowhere near the 
level of the 1988 riots, resulted in the arrest of hundreds of FIS "militants" 
including Madani and Belhadj. By September the siege was lifted, but the 
memory was still fresh.59 
58FBIS-NES-91-092, "Belhadj Warns FIS Will Try Ministers, Military," 13 May, 1991, 
P· 4. 
5'1R_uedy, pp. 253-254. 
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The FlS, without their leaders, was filled with internal divisions. As stated 
earlier, there was much confusion over what exactly the Islamists wanted to 
achieve. The hope of many was that the lslamist party wished to integrate into 
the system without toppling the current regime. Wishful thinking? Perhaps. On 
the eve of 26 December, 1991, the vote tally resulted in 188 seats secured outright 
for the FIS. There was not to be a second round. 
According to Abdelqader Hashani, interviewed for The New York Times at 
an Algiers exhibition hall designed to demonstrate how economic, social, and 
political problems would be handled by the FlS once they were in power, ''It must 
be clear that we are coming to government to solve the problems of Algerians. rrfo() 
He was sure that the lslamists would be victorious in the second round of 
elections as well. When asked about mandatory veiling of women, among other 
Islamic edicts, the article closed with Hashani's reference to "persuasion;" the 
Islamists would " ... persuade, not oblige people into doing what we say."&1 
Hmmm ..... 
The "dispossessed" majority were to remain so. The election results were 
cancelled, and President Chadli Bendjedid found himself unemployed and under 
house arrest. 
60youssef M. Ibrahim, "Islamic Plan for Algeria is on Display," The New York Times, 
Jan. 7, 1992. p. A3. 
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What happened? The prospects of yet another FIS victory were just too 
grim for the ruling elite. The military leg of the triad of strength had been 
gaining power ever since the 1988 riots. Although they were "put on ice" for a 
while, the strength of the military was evidenced by the President's forced 
resignation. The true test of survival politics vs continued emphasis on reforms 
was to have been at the end of December, 1993, when the "mandate" for the High 
State Council expired. 
Algeria has miraculously managed (until this year) to hold off rescheduling 
its 26 billion dollar foreign debt. As in the past, the economy has and may once 
again act as a type of catalyst which propels the next modification to Algerian 
pohtics. The actual motivation for the democratic reversal is still debatable. 
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V. ECONOMIC TRENDS 
The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria is the second largest 
country in Africa. Encompassing 2,381,741 square kilometers, this North African 
nation is home to more than 26 million Algerians. Most of the population (96 
percent) live in the north, as the country's agriculture and industry are also 
concentrated there. 
Once considered to be a leader of the Non- Aligned Movement, this young 
independent nation enjoyed enormous levels of political legitimacy due to its 
inspiring war of independence. Algeria's focus now, however, is more on 
internal, vice external matters. The recent experiment with democracy has so far 
met with tragic ends. The author suggests the powers that be in Algeria chose 
to embrace (at least temporarily) multi-partied elections and reforms for two 
reasons: first, the rise of the Islamist opposition and radicalization against what 
appeared to be a corrupt regime, and second, economic imperatives. Rephrased, 
Algeria faces the dual dilemmas of the Islamic threat and government debt. 
This chapter focuses on the evolution of Algeria's economy, from a Centrally 
Planned Economy (CPE) to the attempts of transition towards a more open-
market oriented society (briefly including the French colonial inheritance). The 
main goal of this study, however, is to attempt to link the oil crisis of 1986 to the 
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riots of 1988 to the subsequent period of reforms from 1989 to 1992. By 1994 the 
"lid" is back on the pot, but the pressure continues to rise. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several authors suggest there is a linkage between <"conomic imperatives and 
0 
political opening. The Middle East political Pconomy in particular has been 
studied in depth. Giacomo Luciani studied oil rent and its role as a factor 
perpetuating authoritarian government. He suggests a fiscal crisis of the state as 
a factor encouraging a greater demand for democracy. "Subsequently, ... the fiscal 
crisis of the State - linked to the decline or disappearance of the source of the rent 
- may be an important stimulant to [the] democratization process.'102 Therefore, 
the fiscal crisis may explain the different state responses to riots in 1985 (before 
the oil price crash) and the response to the 1988 riots. 
Perhaps the most thorough regional review is Alan Richards and John 
Waterbury's A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and Economic 
Development. Throughout their work, the interrelation of politics and economic 
development is stressed. Specifically, the framework of their study focused on 
the interaction between (1) economic growth and structural transformation, (2) 
state structure and policy, and (3) social class."''l Another pertinent discourse is 
provided by Alan Richards in "Economic Imperatives and Political Systems in the 
&l(;iacomo Luciani, ''The oil rent, the fiscal crisis of the state and democratization," 
Unpublished paper, 1993, p. 3. 
b3Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, 
Class, and Economic Development, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1990) p. 8. 
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Middle East and North Africa." He identifies three immediate core challenges: 
jobs, food, and money. According to Richards, "[some] believe 35 percent of 
young Algerians will never have a job."M Food self-sufficiency is not a 
possibility for the region, (nor should it be expected) yet past policies have 
exacerbated the Algerian situation for the worst. 
Many believed the situation could be described in terms of Rousseau's 
"social contract" and the failure of the state to care for its people. A more recent 
examination of relative deprivation and its effect on populations can be found in 
Hirschman's "The Changing Tolerance of Income Inequality in the Course of 
Economic Development."~>5 AppJied to Algeria's case, the general population 
was quite tolerant about income inequities after independence; anything was 
better than French rule. Over time, however, as the people were expected to "bite 
the bullet" and suffer for the new Algeria, the income disparities became more 
noticeable. After the oil crash, many Algerians lost their tolerance for the blatant 
income differences and abuses of power. The oil revenues weren't providing milk 
and honey, and any revenue-sharing expectations there might have been were 
shattered. 
b4 Alan Richards, "Economic Imperatives and Political Systems in the Middle East a .. _ ~ 
North Africa," RAND, 1993, p. 8. 
~>5H.O. Hirschman, ''The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of 
Economic Development," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov. 1973, pp. 544-545. 
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Jurgen Habermas has written extensively on crisis and legitimation 
theory.bb It seems all three of his subsystem points of origin are possible to 
blame for crisis in Algeria as it attempts to transition to a market economy. 
Habermas suggests crises in rationality, legitimation, and motivation can stem 
from economic, political, or socio-cultural sources. While this may seem 
simplistic, the combined effects of all three bear acknowledgement. 
And finally, we can see that the issue of money has finally led Algeria to an 
arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Algeria had previously 
managed to avoid debt rescheduling. 
B. BACKGROUND 
As described earlier in this thesis, Algeria's independence was met with a 
mass exodus of French settlers. With the French went the majority of skilled 
labor, technicians, and administrators. Granted, many acknowledge the fact that 
a "fresh slate" of sorts was provided, but the situation was far from problem-free. 
After President Ben Bella's short-lived "self-management" period of "near-romantic 
populism," the direction shifted to heavy industrialization under President Houari 
Boumedienne. 
1. Sowing Oil to Reap Industry 
The first Five-Year Plan for 1969-1973 launched the heavy industry 
program. According to Richards and Waterbury, oil and natural gas were to 
bf>David Held, "Legitimation Problems and Crisis Tendencies," Political Theory and the 
Modern State, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989) pp. 80-82. 
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serve two purposes: First, they wouid be the "feedstock for a modern 
petrochemical sector" producing fertilizers and plastics; second, the earnings from 
their export would pay for planned steel manufacture and vehicle assembly. The 
agriculture sector was expected to grow as well, using the new products 
(fertilizer, tractors, etc). Foreign firms provided the technology, yet the private 
sector was viewed as irrelevant. Hence the slogan, "sow oil to reap industry." ~>7 
The second Five-Year Plan was met by world petroleum prices that had 
quadrupled. Algeria did not suffer from financing problems, yet the vision for 
the growing agriculture sector was not being realized. The state structure and 
policies led to increased food importation, increased tariff protection, and 
decreased public sector efficiency. Not unlike Egypt in this respect, the 
government had 45 percent of the nonagricultural work force on the government 
payroll. 
By the late 1970's, Algeria was able to invest 25- 30 percent of GOP 
annually. The cost, however, was in inflation and a growing external debt. Even 
though Algeria was able to make remarkable progress, (6 percent growth 
annually and a very high investment ratio) overcentralization, low productivity, 
excess capacity, unemployment, and neglect of the agricultural sector were a few 
of the "bitter fruits" of Boumedienne's development strategy.b8 
&7Richards and Waterbury, p. 199. 
b8Jbid., p. 252. 
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2. U.S.-Algeria Liquefied Natural Gas Price Dispute 
Between 1969 and 1981, the United States and Algeria spent quite a bit 
of time negotiating natural gas contracts. It's very interesting to see how 
perceptions and misperceptions have fogged (or altered) the memory of and the 
rationale for the U.S. decision to cancel the contract in 1981. (This topic is also 
covered from a foreign relations/diplomatic perspective in the next chapter.) 
Import-export deals for natural gas are usually made bilaterally as 
opposed to the international oil market approach. After the El Paso Natural Gas 
Company (a U.S. firm) had its assets nationalized in 1967, negotiations for 
compensation (and possibly new contracts) were fruitful. The contract agreed 
upon between Sonatrach (Algeria's national hydrocarbons company) and El Paso 
Natural Gas Company called for annual delivery of 353 billion cubic feet of 
liquefied natural gas for a period of twenty-five years.69 Pressure from U.S. oil 
companies, the French government (who had their own nationalization problems 
with Algeria) and various groups favoring Canadian and Mexican natural gas all 
took its toll on negotiations. 
The bottom line is that President Reagan's new Administration killed 
the final El Paso deal just after the Algerians helped negotiate the release of 
American hostages from Iran (many Algerians are still waiting for a "thank you" 
for this). Around the same time, Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced 
69 Azzedine Layachi, The United States and North Africa: A Cognitive Approach to ForeiKn 
Policy (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1990) p. 36. 
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a major offensive weapons deal with Morocco, Algeria's rival in the region. 
While the asking price for Algerian LNG seemed too steep for the Americans, 
Algeria eventually had no problem trading with France, Belgium, Spain and Italy 
for the same if not higher price?0 
3. Oil Price Collapse 
The five-year plan adopted in 1984 had as its theme, 'Work and 
discipline to guarantee the future.'m Efficiency and productivity were the targets 
of this plan, even as it acknowledged a possible decline in oil revenues. Although 
there was an attempt at diversification outside the hydrocarbon industry, the 
brunt of the improvements were to be through increased efficiency overall; belt-
tightening days were to follow. However, by 1985 the oil prices began to slip. 
By the summer of 1986 the barrel was ~low $10. Worse yet, the dollar lost more 
than 40 percent of its value against European currencies, the same currencies 
whose countries Algeria depended on for two-thirds of its imports.72 Table 1 
shows the trend of imports, exports, and external debt for the 1984-1988 
timeframe. (DSR= Debt Service Ratio) 
70lbid., pp. 46-47. Also, see "Implications of the U.S.- Algerian Liquefied Natural Gas 
Price Dispute and LNG Imports," U.S. General Accounting Office Report EMD 81-34. 
According to this report, the Algerian government had no "right" to ask for higher 
compensation - regardless of calorific equivalent OPEC oil prices. 
71Ruedy, p. 245. 









IMPORTS, EXPORTS, AND EXTERNAL DEBT, 1984-1988 
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Imports Exports Ext. Debt DSR 
9,234 12,792 14,766 32.8 
8,811 13,034 17,069 32.5 
7,879 8,065 20,566 51.0 
6,616 9,029 24,601 54.0 
6,675 7,620 25,041 87.0 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (1989); Banque centrale d' Algerie 
(1990) and Economist Intelligence Unit: Algeria Country Profile (1989-1990) 
Hydrocarbons make up around 95 percent of Algeria's exports. 
Exposure to the dollar and oil price fluctuations adds even more difficulty to the 
Algerian economy. For every $1 change in the price of a barrel of oil, the current 
account of the balance of payments is affected by $500 million a year7' In 1985, 
hydrocarbons accounted for 98 percent of total exports. The oil price fall 
translated into a 40 percent drop in export earnings for 1986. Table 2 
demonstrates the realities of the price drop for export earnings. 
73
"The Long Road Ahead," Euromoney Supplement, September, 1991, p. 1. 
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TABLE 2 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS - EXPORTS 







Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1993 
C. THE BUILDUP TO THE 1988 RIOTS 
As discussed earlier, the peasant self-management or autogestion agriculture 
policies that followed independence managed to prevent famine, yet the state still 
wanted to regain some control over all the land holdings. The 22,000 self-
managed farms were consolidated into around 2,000 large state farms during the 
1963 to 1966 timeframe?4 When President Boumedienne inaugurated his 
"Agrarian Revolution" in 1971, his "good intentions" could not have predicted the 
1973 windfall oil revenues. Algeria became a victim of the dreaded "Dutch 
74Will D. Swearingen, "Algeria's Food Security Crisis," Middle East Report, September-
October 1990, pp. 21-22. 
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Disease"75 and rapidly lost sight of the earlier goals of basic cereal/ grain self-
sufficiency and the reduction of agrarian inequalities. Food imports soared, and 
the agrarian sector suffered. By 1980, the state agriculture sector was a major 
drain on the treasury. 
When Boumedienne died in 1978, his successor Chadli Bendjedid tried to 
rectify the food situation. His 198D-1984 plan gave official priority to the well-
being of the rural masses. Swearingen suggests however, that despite the 
apparent attention to the agrarian sector, government neglect and peasant 
resistance exacerbated the situation. The government paid artificially low crop 
prices in order to obtain inexpensive food for its industrial workers. The low 
crop prices offered little incentive to the farmers. 
As the situation worsened, apparently almost a third of Algeria's arable land 
was not even being worked. It is believed that the leaders of the revolution 
(FLN) had ma1,aged to expropriate this land for themselves between 1962 and 
1975. Some suggest that if this land had been included in the land reform, cereal 
production could have been increased significantly. 
75-J'here's a separate study which examines the Dutch Disease damage to the traded 
sector. Wealth transfer leads to increased technology transfer, which results in absolute 
shrinkage of the traded sector. This is referred to as Hyper-Dutch Disease. See 
Manoucher Parvin and Hashem Dezhbakhsh, ''Trade, Technology Transfer, and Hyper-
Dutch Disease in OPEC: Theory and Evidence," lnternational]ournal of Middle East Studies, 
Nov. 1988, p. 469. 
51 
------------- - -------------------------------------.. 
By the mid 1980's the agriculture sector drained the treasury over $2 billion 
every year. In anticipation of International Monetary Fund "conditionalities" of 
borrowing, Algeria devalued the dinar by 30 percent, and tried to reduce the food 
subsidies. When the rioting began in October, 1988, food prices were up 40 
percent from the beginning of that year?~> 
The private industrial sector had not been out to win any social worker 
accolades, either. Entrepreneurs had not played by the "rules of the game." Few 
investments had been made in areas designated to job creation in the interior. 
Not unlike the United States during the 1980's, businesses maximized the 
advantages of backwards tax laws and procedures. The rich got richer, and the 
poor got poorer. One report showed 5 percent of the population earning 45 
percent of the national income, while 50 percent of Algerians earned less than 22 
percent." 
Population growth was high- 3.5 to 4 percent annually. Housing was 
inadequate- construction had been put on the back burner for the more pressing 
needs of industry. Thousands of young men born after independence were 
without work (they are still known as hittites- those who lean against the wall all 
day - from the Arabic word hait meaning wall). The concerns raised by Alan 
Richards for today's Algeria were concerns in 1988 too: food, jobs, money. The 
7~>/bid., pp. 24-25. 
77Rachid Tlemcani, "Chadli's Perestroika," Middle East Report, March-April 1990, p. 
16. 
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depravation and idlen·.:>ss led to the riots of October 1988. Was this spontaneous, 
or did the government ~ ~ Mt it? Did the students cry out for democracy or did 
they merely want an end to corruption and a chance for jobs and couscous? 
What role did the Islamists play? 
D. ECONOMIC REFORMS 
Several accounts of the riots imply a conspiracy of sorts. It's not been 
proven, but some believe the riots were instigated in order to separate the state 
from the painful economic reforms by "forcing" a political opening to accompany 
the economic opening. This could be a characterized as a punt by some in 
government who understood the realities of the legitimization crisis they faced. 
Conspiracy theories seem to flourish in the Middle East and North Africa; they 
normally don't hold much water. 
1. External Debt Policy 
Algeria's monetary authorities did not (until recently) believe their 
level of foreign debt relative to exports was excessive, especially since they 
counted on increased hydrocarbon receipts. Short term debt, however, was 
unsatisfactorily high. Therefore, in November 1989 Algeria determined: 
,. All imports of less than $2 million to be paid for on a cash basis 
unless financed under an officially supported export credit line. 
,. All new short term borrowing requests by Algerian banks and 
companies to be reviewed by the Central Bank.78 
78Undated economic handout provided by Algerian Embassy. 
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It appears this policy is working. Table 3 looks at short-term debt 
totals (the 1991 figures don't match the breakdown in Table 4- besides the 
different sources, the reason for the difference is unknown) and at short-term debt 
as a percentage of total external debt (EDT%). Perhaps the policy was just good 
timing, but Algeria also received an unexpected windfall of more than $2 billion 
dollars as a result of the Gulf War. Algeria used this windfall to pay off $600 
million of commercial credits in addition to building up foreign exchange 
reserves. "N 
TABLE 3 
SHORT-TERM DEBT & EDT % 
1989 1990 1991 
(STD in US$ millions) 
STD 1,840 1,384 1,084 
EDT% 6.4% 4.6% 3.8% 
Source: World Debt Tables 1990-1991 
2. Public Sector Autonomy and Monopoly Dismantling 
Law 88-01 freed public sector firms (including commercial banks) from 
the supervision and control of the state and municipal ministries. As limited 
liability companies, their ownership has been transferred to holding companies. 
The situation is more like U.S. shareholders. 
79
"Gulf War Windfall," Euromoney Supplement, September 1991, p. 23. 
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The government no longer has the monopoly on foreign trade. 
According to a sponsorship statemen the Algerian government is attempting to 
diversify by offering fiscal incentives and export assistance for those 
entrepreneurs exploring other industries.80 
3. Finance Reform and the Law on Money and Credit 
As part of the economic reforms, Algeria now has a National Credit 
Plan. The April 1990 Law on Money an Credit is Algeria's attempt to bring its 
financial system in line with market economies. The Central Bank is able to 
adjust the money supply through what would be considered normal means 
(interest rate adjustments, etc.). Capital flow liberalization is provided for in this 
law; the 51 percent Algerian public sector participation in foreign investment 
requirement has been rescinded. The "playing fields" between public and private 
sectors are increasingly being leveled to stimulate competition. Even foreign 
import licenses have been abolished. Algeria has also introduced value added, 
unified personal, and global corporate income taxes.81 
E. ALGERIA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE 
Algeria needs to diversify its economy, yet the current political situation is 
not conducive to other broad-based attempts at diversification. While there may 
not be actual starvation, many Algerians live in poverty. During this research, the 
80
"Algeria- An Economic Overview," Euromoney Supplement, September 1991, p. 7. 
(This section most likely written by the Algerian economy minister.) 
81Trends in Developing Countries, World Bank, 1993, p. 5. 
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author was reminded of the vital role that extended families play in this region. 
Returning to Richard's estimate that 35 percent of Algeria's youth may never get 
a job, it's somewhat understandable that the hittites may find the radical messages 
of certain Islamist groups appealing. The marginalization of certain sectors of the 
population alone is not enough to explain the riots and subsequent demands on 
the government. The "regime" was losing legitimacy prior to the riots of 1988, 
and is still wrestling with prospects for change in the near future. Currently the 
regime is attempting a dialogue with all political parties (including the FIS), 
testing the limits of its tolerance to opposition. After all, "Even God has allowed 
opposition by allowing Satan to live among His people.'182 
1. One Economist's View 
Mohammed Akacem believes there's a danger in staying in power too 
long. Citing Great Britain's Prime Minister Harold Wilson's reason for resigning 
(addressing new problems with old solutions), he feels Algeria is in a similar 
situation. Besides multi-party elections, one of the "new" ways to handle 
Algeria's problems is through debt conversion. It seems to be a simple approach: 
foreign investors can buy Algerian debt at a discount, then convert it into 
Algerian equity. A foreign currency IOU is exchanged for a share of (or 
~ited in Stephen P. Riley, ''The Democratic Transition in Africa: An end to the One-
Party State?" Conflict Studies #245, October, 1991. This was a popular argument in 
Tanzania in support of multi-party democracy. 
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ownership) of a state-owned company.83 This gradual privatiz~tion does not lead 
to inflation as long as no "money" is introduced into the picture. A closing of the 
gap between the black market and official exchange rates would also be 
necessary. 
Of course this is no magic cure. Privatization and currency devaluation 
are not painless economic procedures. Since Akacem's article was written two 
major changes have taken place: Algeria's High State Council has appointed a 
temporary president instead of electing one - resulting in an increased level of 
violence, and the IMF has announced a debt rescheduling arrangement for 
Algeria. 
Akacem was asked about these changes during an interview. He has 
since modified his position on debt conversion. The IMF agreement should suffice 
at this time. T~1ere is some movement in this direction, but he believes debt 
conversion is "not for tomorrow." Besides the lack of economic diversity, the bulk 
of Algeria's debt is still "lopsided" in short-term debt. While objecting to the 
levels of violence recently displayed, one of the main problems remains the lack 
of jobs, and the reluctance foreign manufacturers have to bring their jobs to 
Algeria. The riots of 1988 were "driven' y discontent ... [but also were] a function 
of economics." Stability must be paramount, yet a compromise between the 
military and the Islamist opposition seems so unlikely. The reasons are complex-
&."Mohammed Akacem, "Algeria: In Search of an Economic and Political Future," 
Middle East Policy Vol. 11, Nr. 2, 1993. pp. 56-57. 
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first, there's really no one in charge of the Islamist opposition position, " ... don't 
believe anyone who says otherwise."84 Second, the military only need to look 
to Iran's example of what happens once Islamists take power. Akacem believes 
they are afraid; there's "blood on their hands" and they do not want to face any 
day of reckoning. It is also a mistake to look back to tre command economy days 
of President Boumedianne and think that those were the " ... good old 
days ... Remember, he's the one that got the country in the mess it's in right now." 
2. A View from Anadarko 
Although it is not an "official" position, the input received from a 
geophysicist and from the head of corporate security employed by the Houston-
based Anadarko Petroleum Corporation is both interesting and valuable. Most 
military personnel don't give much thought to civilian commercial interests 
overseas. As long as there is no requirement to interface with or to evacuate 
them, corporate America overseas is not on the military radar scope. 
The author interviewed Mr. Glenn Rainey in order to get his thoughts 
on Algeria. He was working for Anadarko in Algeria off and on from before the 
Gulf War to June 1992.85 Prior to Desert Storm, the only thing he an his wife had 
to fear living in an Algiers suburb was automobile part theft. Although this may 
84Telephone conversation between Dr. Mohammed Akacem, Associate Professor of 
Economics, Metropolitan State College of Denver, as well as editor of Middle East Forum, 
and the author, 10 May, 1994. 
85lnterview between Mr. Glenn Rainey, Geophysicist for Anadarko Petroleum 
Corporation, Houston, and the author, 25 April 1994. 
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say something for the relatively low crime rate, it also indicates perhaps 
infrastructure problems- auto parts were black market items. 
During the "air war" Raney sensed a distancing between Westerners 
and the locals. U'llike some other countries, the American families did not live 
in a U.S. enclave. As a matter of fact, Raney rented a house which belonged to 
a retired general of the Gendarmerie. This came in handy since the general had 
his own emergency generator. During power outages, he was one of the few who 
could resume normal activities. Infrastructure problems abound in today's 
Algeria. Although the road system is advanced, and there are plenty of 
skyscrapers, etc., the infrastructure is crumbling; the water mains ran next to the 
sewer lines, and the phones were unreliable at best. When asked how Anadarko 
could do business without adequate telecommunications, Raney explained that 
Anadarko has received authorization to use their own satellite communications 
system for voice and facsimile operations. 
The oil company people used to socialize with the U.S. Embassy, and 
even had softball games with the U.S. Marines. The families never felt like 
targets, although there were demonstrations outside the embassies of the U.S., 
Canada, and Kuwait. Once the ground war started, families were evacuated, and 
the marines could no longer come out to play. After the war, it was business as 
usual according to Rainey. There was no antagonism, and he reported that it was 
safe for his wife to buy vegetables from the market with only a "Glad you're 
back" directed at her. 
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By February 1992, Anadarko decided to move its exploration office 
back to Houston. The families moved away, and only the engineers remained 
behind. Now rather than fly in through Algiers, the oil companies pool their 
resources and share weekly contract flights directly from Paris into Hassi 
Messaoud (by the oil rigs). The state accommodates this as a point of entry, and 
provides the appropriate customs personnel. Now there are only Algerian 
nationals working at the Algiers Anadarko offices. 
When asked about the black market, Rainey said he knew it was there, 
but that it wasn't too visible to him. The government appeared to vacillate on its 
import policies; easing and then tightening the restrictions on various goods. He 
wasn't sure if the absence and then sudden presence of certain goods (coke, 
candy, etc.,) was due to the black market, or government policies. Anadarko had 
finally been cleared to order goods direct from Peter Justeson, Netherlands. The 
employees were seldom harassed, but the occasional shakedown by customs 
personnel or the police was inevitable. Cigarettes always came in handy, but 
Anadarko Company items -flashlights, keychains, and lighters with the company 
logo on them - were particularly popular and would always help in a pinch. 
Rainey personally would not like to go back, but that decision is based primarily 
on the recent arrival of his son. Anadarko now prefers to send single personnel 
to Algeria. He likened Algerian health care to the level found in the 1950's (which 
doesn't sound too bad). 
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Personally, Rainey believes Anadarko will continue its exploration 
regardless of the political situation. There are "no plans to declare force majeure 
unless the South is attacked." Rainey believes Algeria has great potential since 
it's still not very developed. His estimation of the political scene is familiar: the 
old regime was corrupt, the FIS received the backlash vote, but now the FIS has 
also "revealed themselves to the public." Anadarko doesn't expect production for 
six to ten years (the contract was only awarded in 1990. Sonatrach (the state-
owned oil company) actually owns 11 percent of Anadarko stock due to 
Panhandle Eastern Company's buy out back in 1986. 
The head of Anadarko's corporate security is a man of few words. 
When interviewed, he was asked about security precautions and how his 
company determined risk. Anadarko employs intelligence assessments using 
input from, among others: the U.S. Embassy, the local military and police. When 
pressed further, Mr. Flatt stated, "Our concerns are obvious, our measures are 
proprietary. "Sb 
F. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The International Monetary Fw1d managing director Michael Camdessus 
went to Algeria in February, 1994 to discuss economic restructuring. Algeria 
now admits it is unable to meet its essential needs without a reduction in external 
debt payments. Actually, Algerian officials decided late January 1994 to stop 
Sblnterview between Mr. Biff Flatt, Head, Corporate Security, Anadarko Petroleum 
Company, Houston, and the author, 3 May 1994. 
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medium and long term debt repayments. The missed payments may have 
reflected more than a money shortage. According to Jon Marks, a MEED 
reporter: 
The missed payments ... also preceded a change in the presidency which 
had been expected to result in Abdelaziz Bouteflika's appointment as head 
of state. It is understood that Bouteflika's team was prepared for a quick 
rescheduling- and a decision to cut repayments may have been intended to 
force creditors' hands before the handover. In the event, Bouteflika could 
not agree to terms and General Lamine Zeroual became president.87 
On 11 April, 1994, Mr. Camdessus made a statement on Algeria's economic 
program. The program focused on three major points: 
•allowing a faster development of the private sector management of the 
economy, with an increasing emphasis on price- and market-based incentives; 
•encouraging a reallocation of resources to the productive sectors; and 
•introduce accompanying social measures to strengthen support for the most 
vulnerable population groups. 
The key policy measures include, "adoption of efficient external trade and 
exchange system, substantial reduction in the fiscal deficit, prudent monetary 
policies, and realistic interest rates. "88 
Alth..;ugh even one year ago talk of rescheduling was out of the question for 
Algerian policymakers, the rescheduling should be viewed as a vote of confidence 
by international observers. The devaluation will be unpopular and difficult for 
87Jon Marks, "Algeria," MEED, 18 February, 1994, p. 5. 
88International Monetary Fund News Brief, "Statement by IMF Managing Director on 
Algeria," Number 94/8, April 11, 1994. 
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the general population, but overall the rescheduling should give Algeria some 
much-needed breathing room. 
Specifically, the Algerian stabilization program and the Stand-By 
Arrangement negotiated with the IMF resulted in the following: 
• Adjusting the Dinar value, in spot currency, to a 36 Dinar to One 
Dollar value (this is a 40.17 percent devaluation), effective April 10, 1994. 
*The rediscount rate is set at 15 percent. 
>t'fhe Bank of Algeria will intervene on the monetary market around a 
central rate of 20 percent. 
*The rate applicable to Bank overdrafts at the Bank of Algeria is set at 
24 percent. 
•Interest rates on customer bank credit are negotiable; the ceiling of the 
bank spread is set at five points above the average cost of the bank resources, 
maximum.gq 
Additionally, the IMF restructuring involved bilateral debt restructuring, 
although a Paris Club rescheduling was hoped to be avoided (bilateral debt 
accounts for 60 percent of overall medium and long term debt). 
•Additional resources to be obtained through multilateral institutions 
including the World Bank, African Development Bank, Arab Monetary Fund, 
and the European Union. 
gq"Communique by the Council on Money and Credlt," Algerian Embassy Document 
dated 10 April, 1994. 
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•Rescheduling will cut debt servicing by 4 billion U.S. dollars for 1994, 
and nearly 5 billion for the duration of the Stand By Arrangement (April 1994-
March 1995). 
JtShort term debt will not be rescheduled, and payments will continue 
on time.qo 
Algeria's key debt data can be seen in Table 4. The IMF arrangement was 
probably overdue. 
TABLE 4 
KEY DEBT DATA, 1991-1992 
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Short-term debt 
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~ank of Algeria Press Release, Algerian Embassy, 17 April, 1994. 
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VI. PERCEPTIONS, PERSPECTIVES, AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 
Appearances to the mind are of four kinds: things either are what they 
appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are and do not 
appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Rightly to aim in all 
these cases is the wise man's task. 
Epictetus 
A. APPEARANCES 
How has the land of "couscous and the casbah" been viewed by others- by 
the United States in particular? What separated a "communist" from one who 
was "non-aligned?" What historical (or hysterical) images do policy makers hold 
of Algeria- perhaps pirates, the Barbary coast, Hedy Lamarr or Charles Boyer? 
Anyone reading the Western press in the last few years is probably convinced 
there are secular extremists and radical Islamic fundamentalists busy killing each 
other in Algiers and environs this very moment, threatening the safety and well-
being of Westerners in the process. 
Or, maybe some positions are formed instantly on the basis of Algeria's 
stance , '· ·. 1 e PLO and Israel. A quick survey of arms transfers and IMET dollar 
dis burst . , ·. nts tells yet another story: even among its North African neighbors to 
the East and to the West, Algeria finds itself "out" of U.S. favor. How has the 
psychology of foreign policy makers interpreted and categorized Algeria- both in 
the past and present? This section attempts to examine various views and 
opinions, as well as to interpret some "appearances" that may not be as they seem. 
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The headline reads, "U.S. Shifts Approach to Algeria as Islamic Movement 
Builds ... Hoping to Avoid Being Labeled 'Great Satan'.'191 A look back at the 
U.S.-Algeria history is required before tackling this recent headline. 
In 1957, a young senator J.F. Kennedy made a passionate speech supporting 
Algeria's independence from France. This, needless to say, did not go over well 
with most Frenchmen. The positive effect this had on most Algerians, however, 
was enormous. Later, Kennedy made the following observations: 
To an observer in the opposition party there appear two central 
weaknesses in our current foreign policy: first, a failure to appreciate how 
the forces of nationalism are rewriting the geopolitical map of the world -
especially in North Africa, Southeastern Europe and the Middle East; and 
second, a lack of decision and conviction in our leadership, which has 
recoiled from clearly informing both the people and congress, which seeks 
too often to substitute slogans for solutions, which at times has even taken 
pride in the timidity of its ideas.92 
What might J.F. Kennedy say today if the United States "deferred" to France 
since Algeria is in her sphere of influence? He would probably say the same 
thing he did back in 1957: 
... the complexity of problems thereby created does not absolve the 
United States of the duty of interesting itself in them. The temptation is to 
accept the idea that since our coalition allies have a primary interest there, 
the United States, like it or not, had best take an enforced diplomatic 
holiday.93 
91 Daniel Williams, "U.S. Shifts Approach as Islamic Movement Builds," The 
Washington Post, 19 May, 1994. p. A35. 
92John F. Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 
1, Oct. 1957. 
93lbid., p. 52. 
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Returning briefly to the previously mentioned El Paso Natural Gas Company 
issue, images held by certain U.S. policy makers strongly influenced the outcome 
of the failed LNG deal."f Layachi contends that U.S. - Algerian relations have 
always been characterized by a strange mixture of mutual suspicion interrupted 
by moments of hope. Probably based on Kennedy's interest, the U.S. extended 
$165 million worth of foodstuffs through PL480's "Food for Peace" program. The 
suspicion returned, however, once Algeria's President Ben Bella went to see Fidel 
Castro in Cuba after a visit with President Kennedy.95 
The Non- Aligned movement was never seen as "neutral" by the United 
States. Suspicion continued wnen Morocco (emboldened by the U.S?) staked its 
claim on the Tindouf region of Algeria. Algeria attempted to buy arms from the 
U.S., but was refused only to see repeated arms sales to Morocco. The State 
Department considered Algeria a cold war "danger point" because of Soviet 
influence ..... 
This association radicalized Algeria in the eyes of U.S. officials. Having 
struggled for their own independence, Algeria sided with national liberation 
""Layachi, p. 31. Layachi's study looks at psychology, cognitive mapping, and 
foreign policy. Specific case studies include arms sales to Morocco and Algeria's LNG 
deal with El Paso Natural Gas. 
-.:;Ibid., p. 32. 
~he Soviets were actually the only ones who would "barter" with the cash-strapped 
Algerians. According to military personnel at the Algerian embassy, the Soviets bartered 
weapons and training for such items as tomatoes and oranges!) 
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movements around the world- inspiring many, yet only irritating the U.S. 'Wars 
of national liberation" must have been read as code for "pro-Soviet" or worse. 
Algeria and the United States continued to misread each other up through 
the LNG contract cancellation and the negotiated release of the U.S. hostages from 
Iran. While occasional commercial breakthroughs were made, the overall trend 
of mistrust continued. 
How was it that Algeria remained a militant, anti-American country in the 
eyes of the United States in spite of an obviously less controversial, less 
confrontational development? It's not that all policy makers were blind. For 
example: 
The Algerians worked with Yugoslavia and Xndia at Havana in the 
effort to prevent Cuba from directing the non-aligned movement toward a 
distinctly pro-Soviet position; favored a peaceful resolution to the conflict 
between North and South Yemen at the time when the Soviets were 
supporting the latter in the use of military force; opposed Soviet policy in 
Ethiopia and Uganda by supporting the Eritreans and the Tanzanian-aided 
overthrow of Idi-Amin Dada, and stiffened their previously tolerant attitude 
toward airplane hijacking ... [and] privately criticized Cuba's overambitious 
policy in Africa,[and] the Vietnameses invasion of Cambodia ... .'q 
Talk of "missed opportunities" is quite germane when discussing U.S. -
Algerian relations. The U.S. is naturally leery of identifying too closely to 
individuals in power (the Shah of Iran, for example), yet since President 
Bendjedid, there haven't been any particular "individuals" in power- just 
97Steven J, Solarz, Chairman of the Sub-committee on Africa of the Committee of 
Foreign Affairs, "Report of a Study Mission to Morocco, the Western Sahara .... " 1980. 
Quoted in Layachi, p. 48. 
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secularists. Even Prime Minister Redha Malek's appointment caused nary a 
comment from his "friend" Secretary Warren Christopher. 
Yes, granted, the U.S. was in a quandary once elections were cancelled. The 
Bush Administration was content to hold its breath, hoping for the best, but not 
making any waves one way or the other. Although there were human rights 
abuses reportedly by both the regime and the Islamists, U.S. State Department 
Spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler was quick to only speak out against the Islamist 
armed struggle. Later, Human Rights Watch surmised the key to U.S. reticence 
was revealed in the following speech: 
We are suspect of those who would use the democratic process to 
come to power, only to destroy that very process in order to retain power 
and political dominance. While we believe in the principle of 'one person, 
one vote,' we do not support 'one person, one vote, one time.'98 
At least during this period the U.S. was sending a message of support for 
the current regime- even as it hoped for a return to elections and "democracy." 
The recent headlines indicate some kind of acceptance, some measure of Islamist 
accommodation (as long as they're peace-loving and don't want to hurt anyone). 
Is this in Algeria's best interests? Is this in the United States' best interests? 
Probably not. The prospect of an Islamist government in Algeria is slim; one way 
or the other. The likelihood of an outright coup is also slim. There's much talk 
of a split in the armed forces between Islamists and secularists. The split which 
should be of concern is more likely between the secularist eradicators and the 
9SSecretary Djerejian, 2 June 1992, quoted in Human Rights Watch World Report, 
1993(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992) pp. 293-294. 
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secularist conciliators. A further definition of these last groups should not be 
required. 
It seems misguided to believe that by superficially supporting parties solely 
based on religious platforms, that the United States believes it can avoid being 
pegged as "The Great Satan." First, a newfound desire to be "liked" by a 
fragmented group of extremists is not in the best interests of the U.S. Second, 
over-sensitivity to the West's past equating of Islam with radical religious 
extremism does not exonerate the West from any sudden and erroneous volte-face. 
Many, if not most, of Algeria's Muslims are also against radical 
fundamentalism. They voted for change, they probably didn't vote for sharia law. 
Third, perhaps the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) or the Armed Islamic Movement 
(MIA) will merely be emboldened by this latest vote of "no confidence" for the 
transitional government. 
Is "transitional government" a euphanism for military regime, or 
authoritarian government? Perhaps, but many contend it's better than the 




1. The Gendarmerie 
According to Major Rabah Bekhti, it's only a matter of time before 
order is restored in Algeria.99 As a 22 year veteran of the security service 
(Gendarmerie), Algeria's internal security has been his primary responsibility. 
When asked about the roots of the current unrest, the economic hardships that 
predated the riots of 1988 are the starting point. 
He was quick to point out the riots had nothing to do with a call for 
democracy, nor were they initiated by the Islamists. As suggested earlier, the 
Islamists took advantage of the situation, but did not create the situation. He also 
refuted any possible government instigation of the riots. 
1988 was not the first time the police and Gendarmerie would be called 
out to perform riot control duties; but it was perhaps the first time so many 
youngsters were involved. According to Major Bekhta, "In 1985 there was a small 
group of fundamentalists ... we fixed the problem." When asked about the reports 
of torture and brutality during the 1988 riots, he was not apologetic. Surprisingly, 
his response, "As the French say, you can not make omelettes without cracking 
a few eggs." 
He blamed the riots, quite frankly, on a combination of increasing 
economic difficulties and overt government corruption. He was not a supporter 
~nterview between Major Rabah Bekhti, Algerian Army (Gendarmerie) and the 
author, 9 April, 1994, Monterey, California. Major Bekti was attending DRMI. 
71 
of President Chadli Bendjedid by any means "he was a weak leader." He also 
engaged in what could be called nostalgic reminiscing about the "good old days" 
of President Boumedienne, "In my opinion, if Boumedienne had some years to 
live, we would not be in this situation ... he was a leader ... strong, honest." (This 
is not uncommon to hear. What is somewhat surprising is that there are scme 
who reflect all the way back to the days of French rule.) Boumedienne is 
remembered as a man of vision and honor. If there was corruption during his 
regime, Bekhti believes it was by those around him, not by him. But as the 
economist Mohamed Akacem said, the period of the centrally managed economy 
is perhaps most to blame for Algeria's economic hardships. 
Major Bekhti is a family man; a Berber married to an Arab. He has 
three children. When asked about the "Berber problem" he said there was no 
problem. Certainly during the past, the French exacerbated their differences in 
order to flush out an intermediate class. Sure there are Berber agitators, but most 
Berbers are merely concerned with cultural preservation of their language and 
heritage, not with separatism. He likened the situation to the Black movement 
in the United States- some are more passionate about their wishes, but most are 
just concerned about "white" assimilation. 
Major Bekhti is concerned about the welfare of Algerians, but he's not 
overly distressed. Even though many young people are without jobs, he stressed 
the importance of extended families, free education, a free press, and free health 
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care. Although ten to 20 family members may live under the same roof, no one 
goes hungry. 
When asked about the fairness of the Family Code legislation and its 
impact on Algerian women, he believes there is a huge gap between the theory 
and the practice (not unlike the gap seen in the Arabization policies). 
The whole "situation" in Algeria has been blown out of proportion by 
the Western press. The London and U.S.-based reporting in particular are seen 
as alarmist and unfair. The media, " ... doesn't know how to analyze the situation." 
As far as the detention camps in the South are concerned, he said 5,000 to 10,000 
Islamists have already been released. He scoffed at the human rights 
reports," ... they have their rights, they have television .... " 
Returning to elections, he believes the government's main mistake was 
recognizing the FIS. Early on, he was aware the mosques were being used to 
organize, "I worked in the security system ... we gave advice, saying it may be a 
problem. We were told, don't worry- we're in a democracy now." The bottom 
line is: Algeria can't and should not mix religion and politics. Algeria is an 
Islamic country which should be run by a secular government. The sooner order 
is restored, the better. 
As far as the FLN is concerned, he does not believe they are politically 
viable, but that a ne coalition of secular supporters would be necessary. 
Regionally, there is no true vitality for the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
as far as he was concerned. Using yet another French idiom, he described the 
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union of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco in particular as a "Russian salad." This 
is similar to the "apples and oranges" analogy. Politically, he recognizes Tunisia 
and Morocco are closer to the United States, but he really didn't seem to 
understand why. Once again, the issue of Soviet equipment came up. The fact 
that Algeria never was nor will be communist was stressed. Major Bekhti 
believed the U.S. should support President Zeroual directly, not through the 
French. 
2. Dr. William Quandt Looks Ahead 
Dr. Quandt's book, Revolution and Political Leadership in Algeria, 1954-
1968 predicted that due to extreme elite instability, Algerian leaders would either 
create authoritarianism or an open political system which permitted mass 
participation. Since Algeria has attempted both, a follow-up interview was 
appropriate.100 
According to Dr. Quandt, the odds of a return to multi-party 
democratic politics are slim (depends on the definition of democratic). Perhaps 
there is a possibility of a 'Tunisian" model of controlled democracy. The FLN as 
a political party is finished, but " ... not the relatively secular nationalist position 
it represents." 
Economics continues to play a major role in Algeria's drama. Many 
FIS followers simply had no jobs, and no prospects. As far as the U.S. is 
100Jnterview between Dr. William Quandt; Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution 
and former NSC member, and the author, 26 March, 1994, Monterey, California. 
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concerned, Dr. Quandt admitted the government had been very low-key. 
Believing we don't have much influence, some in the bureaucracy have "written 
off the regime." He also believes high level talks directly with President Zeroual 
are necessary. The U.S. should promise support if he moves quickly on economic 
and political reforms, including parliamentary elections in two or three years. 
In conclusion, he believes all of this might not work, but that the FIS 
alternative would be "bad news." The lslamists are not capable of solving 
Algeria's socio-economic woes; exacerbating many situations (like the role of 
women) as opposed to alleviating them. 
3. Algerian Citizens Speak Out 
Perhaps anecdotal information and case studies can assist Western 
policymakers and the press. Foreign Press reports, botl1 inside and outside of 
Algeria, paint a very grim picture. As discussed earlier, the President is 
attempting to "dialogue" with Islamist groups who are currently at odds with tl1e 
current regime. The recent killing of Abdelkader Alloula, a well-known and 
respected writer, brought a very strong response from many Algerians- not only 
were they against the fundamentalists, but they were angry at the president for 
attempting to dialogue with any group. For example: 
Abdelkader Alloula is gone. A man of culture, an Algerian of talent 
and integrity, is with us no more. Another name has been added to the 
grim roster .... But our politicians remain indifferent. ... How can we tolerate 
the wholesale slaughter of innocents at the hands of blind fundamentalism? 
We have never really mourned our dead: we have only mourned our own 
weaknesses. But the majority of Algerian citizens ... have expressed firm 
resolve to put an end to these terrorists .... The Algerian people have suffered 
enough ... they are calling on all patriots to insist that the regime put an end 
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to all t:cforts to destroy national unity, unmask the destabilizers trying to 
exploit civil turmoil, and put an end to the massacre of Algerians. 101 
And another article by an antifundamentalist group: 
One of the nation's irreplaceable cultural and artistic treasures has been 
shattered. This is what fundamentalism is really about, for nothing but 
violence and extremism can result from its totalitarian, obscurantist 
ideology ... Honorable, patriotic Algerians will not forget that. .. when 
assassinations are taking the lives of its writers and poets, of thinkers and 
scientists, of white-collar and blue-collar workers, of men and women who 
reject fundamentalist oppression and terror, almost the entire political class 
and certain coteries within the regime are behaving with ever-increasing 
cowardice and irresponsibility in their efforts to absolve and rehabilitate the 
Islamist parties and their criminal leaders.102 
Many groups appear like warlords; setting dress and living criteria for 
their own individual areas. One report said someone issued a fatwa so the 
fundamentalists would be excused from fasting during the holy month of 
Ramadan (they would need all their strength to terrorize the neighborhood). 
In an article written around International Womens' Day, the author 
lamented the toll this period of upheaval has had on Algeria's women. The list 
is long and sordid; the "terrorist" fundamentalists often find it necessary to 
include rape and also murder (usually by gunshot or throat slitting,) as forms of 
"law enforcement" or message delivery. 103 The atrocities are a matter of record, 
but the saddest fact is one can call them terrorists- but they're all Algerians. 
101Farida Ramse, "A Citizen Reacts," ]PRS-NEA-94-020, 29 April, 1994, p. 9. 
102/bid., "Ettahaddi Movement." 
10~alim Ghazi, "Terrorism: The Women it Kills," ]PRS-NEA-94-020, 29 April, 1994, pp. 
14-15. 
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C. CURRENT POLICY 
Returning to the Washington Post headline, yes, there has been a shift in the 
official U.S. position. Recent testimony made before the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee by the acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs 
Mark Parris may have been "overwritten" in the story by the Washington Post 
reporter, but the message still came through. The difficulty our government must 
face in trying to read another country's intent and forecast democratic happy 
endings has been made all too clear in Algeria's case. Attempts to conduct 
research through the State Department led to varied results. 
1. Office of Maghreb Affairs 
Edward Vazquez believes the situation in Algeria guaranteed 
marginalization of the population. Since cancellation of the elections, the lslamists 
have been "driven underground." This resulted in sustained polarization, but also 
increased the popularity of the Islamists.104 While the Algerian government has 
taken commendable, if not drastic measures of currency devaluation in 
preparation for an IMF arrangement, the political progress has not been as good. 
Mr. Vazquez believes time is running out for the current regime. There 
has been no clear indication that meaningful dialogue attempts have been made. 
There is a three step process required: contact, dialogue, and negotiate. He 
believes only the first step has been attempted. 
104Interview between Mr. Edward H. Vazquez, Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb 
Affairs, Department of State, and the author, 26 May, 1994. 
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2. The U.S. Ambassador to Algeria 
The Honorable Mary Ann Casey was contacted during this research for 
her unclassified assessment of the current environment. She graciously responded 
to the author's query, yet rather than answer specific questions directly, she 
referred the author to the recent House testimony provided by Secretary Parris. 
3. Secretary Parris' Testimony, and Congressional Questioning 
Although reiterating President Zeroual's own 7 February, 1994 
statements of both his commitment to political dialogue and participation of all 
political forces "without exception" and his commitment to implement liberalizing 
economic reforms, Mr. Parris' basic message was not as encouraging: 
The regime must find a means of bringing disaffected elements of the 
populace into a process to chart a new, democratic course for Algeria. We 
agree with the major Algerian parties, which insist that this process must 
involve a broadening of political participation to encompass all factions, 
including Islamist leaders who reject terrorism. We have followed with 
interest indications from Algiers that government officials have met with 
representatives of the Islamic Salvation Front. But we have not seen the 
fruits of such contacts---if indeed they have occurred. 105 
In testimony and during questioning, Mr. Parris (which could be read 
as implying the Algerian President lied and that U.S. Embassy Algiers' 
information was possibly not accurate) reiterated two themes: the U.S. has little 
to no influence besides our "words," and that security measures alone will not 
solve Algeria's crisis. The question of how to dialogue with factions who would 
105Mark R. Parris, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, 
"Opening Statement Before the House Foreign Affairs Cmr.mittee, Subcommittee on 
Africa," 22 March, 1994. 
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rather kill than negotiate never came up. It's interesting to note how the question 
"What if the elections hadn't been cancelled?" was never really addressed. Also, 
according to Rep Donald Payne (D-NJ), the FIS is in fact a front, a coalition of 
various groups. Before elections, he suggests the FIS members were not militant. 
Mr Parris later reported that after elections, the various splinter groups including 
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) were the real problem, not the FIS. If they were 
a front, what's the point? All factions, whether naughty or nice, would have 
taken power based on coalition politics. 
It seems the U.S. position favors human rights and is critical of human 
rights abuses (on all sides), favors a democratic system, Jn electoral process, and 
economic reform. Representative Harry Johnson (D-Fl) asked, "Is there any 
country in the world we don't favor those four things in?" 
D. COMMENTS FROM THE ALGERIAN EMBASSY 
Although not official positions, the input received from various Algerian 
Embassy personnel was quite valuable!06 Social and economic concerns may 
take a backseat at times to the political concerns, yet jobs, housing, youth issues, 
the economy, and providing a "safety net" for their fellow Algerians were all 
issues which need attention as well. 
106lnterview between Colonel Mohamed Tabet, Defense, Naval and Air Attache; Mr. 
Kamel Retieb, Economic Attache; Major Mohamed-Abdelouahab Rouai, Military Attache, 




With respect to the current situation, their perspectives were candid and 
enlightening. As Secretary Parris stressed, a dialogue with all parties concerned 
is necessary. The Algerians agreed. They also said the transition period before 
elections were held could be shorter than advertised, but only if two conditions 
were met: the security level must permit free movement and the economic 
situation must be stabilized. They failed to understand why the U.S. expects the 
Algerians to dialogue with groups who bring "guns to the table." As they stated, 
there must be a clear commitment from the other parties, "Even Arafat knew he 
had to publicly renounce violence if he was to continue negotiations for the PLO." 
Not unlike Major Bekhti's interview, the Algerian Embassy personnel 
discounted many accounts as merely ''bad press." However, they did point out, 
"but we're not living in heaven." Talk of young men avoiding army conscription 
(to avoid being killed by Islamists) was interpreted as a normal phenomenon of 
young men everywhere, attempting to avoid the military. They glossed over 
certain topics, but it was still far from sugar-coated. When asked about reports 
of pro-government (possibly government-sponsored) death squads such as the 
Organization of Free Algerians, their assessment was different than had been 
expected. There's no evidence linking any actions to agents of the state. Instead 
of a statement such as, "we will not tolerate these violent acts, regardless of who's 
doing them," the author was reminded that," .. .it's understandable to look for 
revenge. Imagine if your child or husband had been killed, and you knew who 
was responsible .... " 
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Although by all accounts the Algerians should love to hate the French, the 
relationship is much more complicated than that. They appreciate France's clear 
support for the military, and also acknowledge France's legacy in Algeria. The 
legal code, their education system, and much more have been influenced by 
France- even their outlook on certain matters. Colonel Tabet learned Arabic as 
a foreign language and was grateful for the education he received, but he will 
never forget that well over one million Algerians (of eight million) died for 
Algeria's independence. It's not so much that they hold a grudge against the 
French, it's that they fiercely want to protect that which they took back from 
France. 
As representatives of the people, the military's role is to support the 
Constitution, and honor election results. The state remains regardless of who's in 
power. (There still seems to be a gray area focused on political parties which 
might take power, yet don't support the Constitution.) The military has been 
rt>moved from the FLN power structure for the last six years. The problem with 
most opposition parties, they believe, is that they have no program. They are 
unskilled or naive in political and economic matters. For example, certain 
statements by the FIS concerning abolishing various taxation schemes were "tax 
fallacies," and notions of forbidding women to work removes 51 percent of 
Algeria's teachers from the workplace alone. 
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The advice they had for U.S. policymakers? 
,.Look to Algeria's needs, and give it the same type of support provided to 
other friendly governments- be fair. 
*Support secular governments, including Algeria. 
~Recognize the threat of fundamentalism is real. 
,.Make sure the State Department sends clear messages. 
,.Recognize Algeria has never been and never will be communist. As Colonel 
Tabet said, "I've flown MiG-21s all my military career. I would love to fly an F-
16, but you won't sell them to us." 
,.Offer mediation between parties, monitor their elections and help them 
ensure the next round is free and fair. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
As the title of this thesis suggests, Algeria is in a transition period. The 
Islamic threat coupled with government debt is more than most regimes could 
withstand. However, Algeria is not a "typical" developing country. At the risk 
of sounding trite, Algeria's tenacious history is not something to be easily 
overlooked. Suffering much during both French rule and a horrific "Million-man 
Revolution," the 3,000 plus deaths suffered since elections were canceled will 
wuortunately not be a final count. Matters will get worse before they get better. 
The bottom line is, the United States should not underestimate the resilience of 
either the Algerian people, or the current regime. 
Economics has played a major role since Algeria's independence. 
Hirschman's theory of changing tolerance levels based on a form of relative 
deprivation and income inequity coupled with Luciani's theory of oil rent fiscal 
crisis and trends for democracy are valid for the case of Algeria. The recent IMF 
debt rescheduling arrangement for Algeria is a very positive step. In the long run 
this could ease this period of transition. 
But what will Algeria transition to? There are myriad definitions of 
democracy from which to choose. Sometimes all that can truly be hoped for is 
"good government." The United States has been working on its model for over 
200 years. The eminent Middle East scholar George Lenczowski had this to say: 
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I have mixed feelings about it (Algeria's situation). Of course, the 
democratic process of elections was violated by the cancellation of elections. 
On the other hand, I think we should bear in mind that democracy does not 
consist of elections only. There are other important ingredients of the 
democratic process: rule of law, observance of human rights, division of 
powers, a truly independent judiciary, and tolerance for other religions 
beyond the dominant one. Thus it is difficult to condemn wholesale the 
secular government of Algeria for greventing a basically non-democratic 
Islamic power from seizing power.1 
Algeria's "Platform on the National Consensus for the Transitional Period" 
asked all "participating parties" to support the following commitments: 
*The preservation and strengthening of national unity; 
*The respect of the republican character of the State; 
*The respect of the values of Islam as religion of the Algerian State, 
foundation of society and the personality of the Algerian people; 
*The respect of the Arabic language as the national and official language; 
*The acceptance of pluralism and alternance of power; 
*The respect of the rules of democracy; 
*The respect and promotion of public and individual liberties; 
*The non-use of violence as a means of political expression, access to or 
maintenance in power; 
*The non-use of religion for political purposes; 
*The non-use of public and official places and mosques for political 
purposes; 
107Letter from George Lenczowski to the author, 19 May, 1994. 
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"The respect and promotion of the national popular heritage, and the 
prohibition to monopolize it. 1011 
Unfortunately, the National Conference was boycotted by all parties. As 
Representative Harry Johnston (D-Fl) observed during Secretary Parris' testimony, 
"They gave a party and nobody showed." 
Algeria is a potential powerhouse in the region. Tunisia, Morocco and 
France in particular are closely watching the situation. If stability is not 
maintained in Algeria, the spillover effects may be devastating for the region. 
The likelihood, however, of an Islamic takeover remains shm. There are still 
many unknowns, but it does seem likely (if not necessary) for the regime to 
convince the more moderate political hopefuls to join forces with the current 
regime against the extremist radicals who are attempting to destroy the status 
quo, one life at a time. 
108
"Platform on the National Consensus for the Transition Period," Embassy of 
Algeria document, Second draft 25 Dec, 1993. 
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